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ABSTRACT
This study explores possible reasons for why consumers persist in their beliefs
despite being exposed to substantial disconfirm ing evidence. The theory o f cognitive
dissonance (Festinger 1957) provides an important foundation for the pervasiveness o f
the confirm ation bias and belief perseverance. Four main research paradigms o f
cognitive dissonance theory are discussed: free choice, induced or forced compliance,
belief disconfirm ation, and hypocrisy. Confirm ation bias and belief perseverance are
positioned in the b elief disconfirm ation paradigm.
Confirm ation bias refers to the general tendency to readily accept evidence that
supports o n e’s beliefs and to reject or avoid evidence that goes against such beliefs.
B elief perseverance, a phenom enon attributed to the confirm ation bias, is the tendency
to continue believing what we do in the face o f disconfirm ing evidence. This study
assesses w hether contrary evidence has an effect on consum er beliefs regarding the
perceived benefits o f organic food consumption.
Dissonance research in m arketing has prim arily focused on consum er decision
m aking and post-purchase regret. For this reason, the study exam ines the impact o f pre
purchase cognitive dissonance using a m ixed methods approach. Subjects are exposed to
considerable disconfirm ing evidence, and subsequent b elief perseverance (or change) is

examined. These effects on cognitive dissonance and purchase behavior are tested. A
qualitative

assessm ent

of

open-ended

responses

regarding

instances

of

belief

perseverance is also conducted; results and key m anagerial im plications are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND CONTRIBUTIONS

B elief Perseverance
" I f one were to attem pt to identify a single problem atic aspect o f human reasoning that
deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias w ould have to be am ong the
candidates fo r consideration " (Nickerson 1998, 175).
Accumulated evidence dem onstrates that purchasing behaviors are influenced by
consum ers’ personal values, cognitions, and experiences (Cum m ings and Venkatesen
1976; Pious 1993; Benoit and Benoit 2008). Dramatic advancem ents in information
accessibility have made consumers more aware o f third party evaluations o f brands. For
instance, consumers can readily access expert opinions, user experiences and/or product
reviews online. That said, what occurs when consum er beliefs about a brand are
disconfirm ed by new evidence? Do information credibility and brand involvement
matter? Do consumers persist in their attitudes about the brand, or do they change their
behaviors based on the new information? Can consum er beliefs and opinions about
brands impede their rationality? This research intends to address these questions.
B elief perseverance represents a general psychological phenom enon that involves
the tendency o f consumers to cling to their belief systems even after receiving new
information that contradicts or disconfirm s those beliefs (Anderson 2007). In other
words, belief perseverance describes the tendency to continue believing and behaving in
ways that contradict disconfirm ing evidence.
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B elief perseverance is typically tested using an experimental setting known as
the debriefing paradigm (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 1975; Anderson, Lepper and Ross
1980; A nderson 1982; M isra 1992). In this brand o f experimentation, false evidence
(unknow ingly to subjects) is presented regarding a particular hypothesis, after which
subjects’ attitude change is measured.

Subjects are then

‘debriefed’ by their

experim enters when the fictitious evidence is brought to light and com pletely discredits
the basis for any possible changes in belief. The last stage o f the experim entation
measures attitude change once more to determ ine if incorrect beliefs formed by the
subjects persist even after standard debriefing.
Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) conducted experimental research that
revealed the strength o f belief perseverance. They asked subjects to distinguish between
real and fake suicide notes and provided them with random feedback afterward; some o f
the subjects were inform ed that they succeeded, while others were inform ed that they
failed at the given task. Even after being fully debriefed, subjects were still influenced
by the feedback they had previously received. That is, subjects still believed that they
were better or w orse at the given task depending on their initial feedback.
In another debriefing study, Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980) exposed
subjects to two case studies that portrayed either a positive or a negative relationship
between risk taking and success as a firefighter. The notion o f belief perseverance was
supported regardless o f the particular relationship “evidence” that the subjects were
exposed to, i.e. w hether risky firefighters are better at their jobs or vice-versa.
Experimental results also suggest that b elief perseverance is enhanced when subjects are
explicitly asked to explain the evidence they were given. In addition, the researchers

3

conclude that “initial beliefs may persevere in the face o f a subsequent invalidation o f
the evidence on which they are based, even when this initial evidence is itself as weak
and inconclusive as a single pair o f dubiously representative cases” (Anderson, Lepper
and Ross 1980, 1045).
Subsequent research by A nderson (1982) reveals that subjects that were
encouraged to consider both positive and negative relationships between risk preference
and firefighter success showed significantly less belief perseverance. In one o f the very
few m arketing papers that tests belief perseverance, M isra (1992) exam ines subject
responses to rumors about restaurant and retailing chains and provides results to further
support the underlying phenom enon o f confirm ation bias and b elief perseverance.
A ccording to Godden (2012), belief perseverance presents two issues regarding
reasoning and rationality. The first issue is the inherent difficulty o f “describing the
nature and extent o f the phenomenon, and o f explaining how and why it occurs” (Godden
2012, 51). The second issue with research on belief perseverance is the norm ative
concern o f “w hether, and to what extent, belief perseverance is rational” (Godden 2012,
51). The focus o f this dissertation is on the first issue in addition to investigating the
im pact o f belief perseverance on salient marketing outcomes.

Confirm ation Bias
Confirm ation bias is a one-sided case-building process that involves the unwitting
selectivity in the acquisition and use o f evidence (Nickerson 1998). In other words,
confirm ation bias represents people’s general tendency to 1) readily accept evidence that
supports their beliefs, and 2) reject evidence that goes against their beliefs. People might
try to discredit evidence that disagrees with their beliefs, and/or they m ight choose to
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avoid exposure to the disconfirming evidence all together. Confirm ation bias has becom e
som ewhat o f a “catch-all phrase” that incorporates biases in both inform ation search and
interpretation (Fischhoff and Beyth-M arom 1983). However, according to Pious (1993),
the term typically refers to a preference for information that is consistent with a
hypothesis instead o f information which opposes it. This reality is contrary to the
standard rules o f philosophy o f science that lay a heavy emphasis on testing hypotheses
by trying to refute or falsify them. Scientific researchers are also people and are therefore
prone to exhibiting confirm ation bias; they should be extra cautious with their data search
and their interpretation.
Sir Francis Bacon is one o f the earlier prom inent thinkers who identified this
particular type o f cognitive bias centuries ago in his Novum Organum Scientiarum, or
‘New Instrument o f Science’ published in 1620:
“The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion ... draws all
things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater num ber and
weight o f instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and
despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects” (cited in Lord, Ross
and Lepper 1979, 2098).
Positive test strategy is an intentional search for confirm ing evidence (Kahneman
2011). That people/researchers tend to seek data that are more likely to be com patible
with their beliefs is well-known. For exam ple, according to DeM ers (2015), confirmation
bias is one o f the most common cognitive biases for business owners. Entrepreneurs,
especially those who are passionate about their business, have a high tendency to
interpret inform ation based on previous beliefs or assumptions, rather than letting the
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data speak for themselves. Confirm ation bias com monly leads entrepreneurs to interpret
qualitative data, such as survey comments, in a way that endorses their preconceived
notions, i.e. readily accepting supportive data and dismissing, or arguing against, the
validity

o f any

disconfirm ing

data.

Hence,

DeMers

(2015)

recom m ends

that

entrepreneurs should let the numbers do the talking and overcom e confirm ation bias by
relying more on quantitative rather than qualitative data.
Mynatt, Doherty, Tweney (1977; 1978) suggest that confirm ation bias is difficult
to eliminate. In their 1977 study, they designed a simulated research environm ent in
which they asked subjects to seek out particular laws o f particle motion. The subjects
were random ly provided with one o f three separate directives that consisted o f
instructions to confirm, instructions to disconfirm , or instructions to test. Depending on
which instructions were received, the subjects were informed that the fundamental duty
o f a scientist is 1) confirm ing/supporting theories and hypotheses, 2) disconfirm ing/
disproving theories and hypotheses, or 3) testing theories and hypotheses. Results
showed that subjects were much more likely to search for confirm ing evidence
regardless o f which instructions were received. Even the subjects who received
instructions to disconfirm tended to exhibit substantial confirm ation bias during the
discovery task (M ynatt, Doherty and Tw eney 1977).
In their subsequent research, M ynatt et al. (1978) exam ined instructions to
disconfirm even further using a sim ilar study design. However, this tim e the subjects
were random ly assigned to one o f only two groups. The subjects either did not receive
any instructions at all (control group), or the subjects received very thorough
instructions to disconfirm that stressed the importance o f falsification and testing
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multiple hypotheses. Yet, again, the extensive instructions to disconfirm had very little
or no effect on trying to dim inish the inherent confirm ation biases o f the subjects
(M ynatt, Doherty and Tw eney 1978).
How does confirm ation bias affect consum ers? Due to this particular type o f
cognitive bias, consumers find it easier to accept information that confirms what they
already believe regarding products, services, prices, preferred brands, etc., instead o f
having to reform ulate their views. Conversely, consumers may tend to ignore inform ation
that contradicts their beliefs. As inquisitive human beings constantly striving to make
connections, consum ers are very good at finding patterns where they are not, and this
m ay lead to a warped understanding o f reality. Unfortunately, many consum ers would
likely ignore any information which may prove them wrong. Hence, overcom ing
confirm ation bias can be a problem for marketers who aim at providing objective
inform ation that contradicts consum er beliefs.

M otivation for the Study
Consum ers make purchases in the pursuit o f value. This pursuit is driven by
consum ers’ recognition o f a value deficit or imbalance. Thus, the goal o f m arketing is to
create value for consumers. Bazerman (2001) argues for a m ore consum er-focused
approach o f consum er research to help people make w iser decisions. W ith an ethical,
consum er-centric mindset, the goal o f m arketing should be to create true and unbiased
value for consumers. W hat if consumers hold incorrect beliefs regarding products,
services, prices, brands, etc.? The effects o f this quandary may be in favor or not in favor
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o f marketers. At any rate, marketers should feel a sense o f responsibility in ensuring that
their custom ers are w ell-inform ed and aware o f the facts pertaining to their value
offerings.
In particular, according to the U.S. Departm ent o f Agriculture (USDA), the goal
o f organic foods and organic farming is to “integrate cultural, biological, and mechanical
practices that foster cycling o f resources, promote ecological balance, and conserve
biodiversity.” Products are only labeled “USDA organic” when they contain 95% or
more certified organic contents.
People who buy organic food pay premium prices and cite the following reasons
for doing so (W atson 2012):
1)

Organic foods are “safer,” e.g. organic fruits and vegetables are generally
grown without chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and organically raised
livestock are not given any growth hormones or antibiotics.

2)

Organic farm ing practices are “kinder to the environm ent,” i.e. they are
designed to be more sustainable by em phasizing conservation and
reducing pollutants.

3)

Organic foods are “healthier,” i.e. organic foods are more nutritious than
conventionally farmed foods.

W atson (2012) asserts that o f these three reasons, the healthy/nutritional claims
for organic foods have been the most unsubstantiated. For exam ple, Sm ith-Spangler et al.
(2012) evaluated extensive data by conducting a meta-analysis that included 237 studies
o f foods and o f hum an diets. The noteworthy research endeavor was not outside financed
for the prevention o f conducting biased research (Chang 2012). The researchers, from
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Stanford University, concluded that organic fruits and vegetables are not more nutritious
than conventionally farmed produce. Furthermore, results showed that there are no
significant health advantages to organic meats, and that organic foods are not any less
likely to be contam inated by dangerous bacteria such as E. coli. Organic produce,
however, did have 30% lower risk o f contamination with detectable pesticide residue
com pared to conventional produce (Sm ith-Spangler et al. 2012). Nonetheless, Dena
Bravata, one o f the Stanford University researchers, asserted that there is no robust
evidence to choose organic over conventional foods if the choice is based m ainly on the
idea that organic foods would provide more nutrients (Chang 2012).
How will organic food buyers, especially those who strongly believe that organic
food is more nutritious than conventional food, react to this disconfirm ing inform ation?
W ill their beliefs change or will they persevere? W ould buyers o f organic food continue
to buy (and pay m ore for) organic if they become aware o f this disconfirm ing
inform ation? These are some o f the issues that have inspired this research endeavor.

Research Questions
Can varying m essage com ponents such as the source o f inform ation/credibility
and m essage strength affect people’s knowledge change? One potential response to this
question is perhaps not. Through the study o f b elief change in the debriefing paradigm,
mentioned previously, beliefs have been docum ented to change and persevere in the face
o f even weak initial “evidence” (e.g. Anderson, Lepper and Ross 1980). Is the same true
for b elief change outside the realm o f the debriefing paradigm ? Can varying strength o f
actual evidence affect consum er beliefs?
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Peeters (1983) provides an especially interesting direction for future research on
belief perseverance in the realm o f consum er behavior that she labels “hypothesistesting.” In her investigative framework, subjects are presented with a m odem hypothesis
to test. Evidence provided would need to include an explanation for the subjects' previous
beliefs along with even more influential opposing or disconfirm ing evidence regarding
what “should” be believed. She suggests that such a technique could be effective in
bringing about b elief change. If subjects accept the new hypothesis for testing, then they
will tend to begin collecting confirm ing evidence for the new hypothesis. Thus, through
this hypothesis-testing experience, subjects may attain a sense o f awareness o f their
current beliefs in tandem with why they should change their beliefs in light o f the new
evidence. W ith the guidance o f the experimenter, the subjects will essentially be doing a
form o f process debriefing on their own (Peeters 1983).
The study will use 1) a partial hypothesis-testing framework to exam ine the
effects o f b elief disconfirm ations and 2) a qualitative assessm ent o f belief change
resistance. The study will investigate the research questions regarding dissonance and
belief perseverance which can have significant implications for marketing and consum er
behavior:
RQ1: C1an disconfirm ing evidence exposure induce considerable dissonance? I f
so, how does varying the strength o f disconfirm ing fa ctu a l evidence affect
consumer beliefs?
RQ2:

What are the effects o f dissonance (consonance) resulting from b elief

disconfirmation (confirmation) on purchase-related outcom es?
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RQ3:

Why do consumers continue to hold onto their beliefs even though they are

exposed to robust, disconfirm ing evidence that suggests a b e lie f change is
warranted?
In summary, the ensuing research will assess whether robust, disconfirm ing
evidence has an effect on consum er beliefs. The investigation will attem pt to induce a
state o f dissonance via b elief disconfirm ation and will also evaluate salient m arketing
outcom es

including

perceived

value,

purchase

intention,

and

word-of-m outh.

Furtherm ore, the research will attempt to discover reasons why consum ers m ight persist
in their inaccurate beliefs despite being exposed to substantial disconfirm ing evidence.

Contributions o f the Research
Theoretical Contributions
This research aims at linking the pervasive psychological phenom ena o f
confirm ation bias and belief perseverance to Festinger’s (1957) theory o f cognitive
dissonance. Consum er research on cognitive dissonance has limited the scope o f this
extensive theory by narrow ly focusing on occurrences o f dissonance after a consum er has
m ade a decision or a purchase. Although available research on post-purchase dissonance
(or buyer’s rem orse) provides important theoretical and practical implications, the current
study argues that dissonance may arise in numerous ways other than decision making.
Among the main goals o f this study is to dem onstrate that dissonance could arise
prior to a purchase due to b elief disconfirm ing evidence regarding perceived product
benefits. This research attempts to invoke dissonance by presenting people with
disconfirm ing evidence about the perceived benefits o f buying and consum ing organic
foods. An empirical test o f dissonance provocation resulting from perceived belief
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disconfirm ations is conducted. Moreover, the research exam ines the im pending effects o f
dissonance on purchase-related intentions. Consequently, this research will offer and use
an alternative approach to testing cognitive dissonance theory.
An exam ination o f extant literature reveals a lack o f existing scales for measuring
a person’s proclivity to belief perseverance. A qualitative investigation o f why consum er
beliefs persevere could initiate a solid foundation for developing a new scale o f belief
perseverance. Developing such a scale would be a valuable tool for consum er research
aiming to identify and examine obstinate consum er behavior.
M anagerial Contribution
A ccording to Hunt (1970), academic research on cognitive dissonance could only
benefit m arketing practitioners if it provides guidance as to w hat can and should be done
about a custom er’s dissonance. M arketing m anagers are cognizant that being able to
successfully reduce dissonance levels o f their patrons can provide a very vital
com petitive advantage. Answering the question o f why custom ers’ erroneous beliefs can
persist despite exposure to substantial disconfirm ing evidence should offer im portant
im plications for marketing strategy.
For instance, it can be argued that consumers tend to adopt inaccurate information
when such inform ation promotes a potentially ingratiating self-concept. Given that
organic food consum ption is generally considered prosocial, and therefore potentially
ingratiating, consum ers may aspire to be perceived as someone who consumes organic
food. As such, consum ers with a positive orientation toward organic food promotion, in
particular, m ay make themselves vulnerable to accepting superficial inform ation or even
inform ation that is known to be incorrect if that inform ation promotes their self-image. It
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is conceivable that this effect would be exacerbated in instances o f high category
involvement. Therefore, this research has important implications for policy makers and
marketers in their quest to educate consum ers and influence their behaviors. M oreover, a
qualitative assessm ent o f belief perseverance is a step forward for more constructive
com m unication between policy makers, marketers, and custom ers about how to mitigate
the enactm ent o f incorrect beliefs.
How can m anagers convince consumers to disconfirm preconceived notions about
certain products? How can they use their prom otions to strengthen the argument against
misguided consum ption and get consumers to question their behaviors?
To the researcher’s knowledge, consider-the-opposite strategy is the only
available technique that has been shown to successfully rem edy the confirm ation bias and
instances o f b elief perseverance (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 1975; Anderson 1982; Lord,
Lepper and Preston 1984). This technique simply involves encouraging custom ers to
reflect on reasons that their subjective beliefs m ight be incorrect and why the opposing
view may instead be true. The current study will utilize open-ended statem ents that aim
to reveal w hy beliefs persist in the face o f disconfirm ing evidence. This investigation
could potentially discover new corrective strategies for overcom ing b elief perseverance.
M oreover, the current study will provide marketers with alternative de-biasing strategy(s)
for “considering the opposite.”

Dissertation Organization
W hereas C hapter One opens the subject o f confirm ation bias and the phenom enon
o f belief perseverance, Chapter Two links these phenom ena to the relevant theoretical
framework(s). M oreover, an overview o f research on cognitive dissonance and belief
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disconfirm ation is provided along with a research model and subsequent hypotheses.
Chapter Three outlines the research m ethodology as well as m easurem ent instruments
used for testing the research hypotheses. In Chapter Four, the study results are reported
and analyzed. Lastly, Chapter Five offers a discussion o f findings, contributions o f the
dissertation, study limitations and avenues for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

DEFINITIONS, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theories o f Cognitive Consistency
W here does b elief perseverance fit in the grand scheme o f theory? Cognitive
consistency theories are a cluster o f principles o f social psychology that attempt to
uncover and explain human cognition (Simon and Holyoak 2002). Theories o f cognitive
consistency suggest that people are inherently inclined to maintain equilibrium between
their beliefs and observable behaviors and seek to resolve any inconsistencies (Abelson et
al. 1968). Cognitive consistency theories include balance theory (H eider 1958), congruity
theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), sym m etry theory (Newcomb 1953), affectivecognitive consistency (Rosenberg 1956), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger
1957). There are various ways o f referring to cognitive inconsistencies depending on the
theory evoked (e.g. cognitive imbalance, incongruence, asymmetry, inconsistency,
dissonance). A m ajor assumption in such theories is that people are motivated to seek
harmonious attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, values, behaviors, and feelings.
Theories o f cognitive consistency share the same Gestaltian origins. Gestalt
psychology or gestalism is a school o f thought that stresses the im portance o f individual
perceptions and m aintains that the mind exists independently with a reality o f its own.
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A ccording to G estalt psychology, people have a natural tendency to perceive the
environm ent in ways that are simple and coherent (K ohler 1929).
Balance

theory

(H eider

1958)

explains

how

a person

develops

his/her

relationships with other people and his/her environm ent (triadic format). Assuming that
people see a set o f cognitive elements as being a system, the theory suggests that people
will have a preference to maintain a balanced state am ong these elements. Consequently,
when a person perceives an imbalance, he/she will be m otivated to restore that balance.
Due to its rigid triadic structure, balance theory is not capable o f describing the
beliefs leading to one’s attitude toward an object. More specifically, the theory is
incapable o f explaining the variability o f belief strength or m essage content. A ccording to
Benoit and Benoit (2008), the theory’s underlying com ponents are more inform ative and
less explanatory. Thus, balance theory appears to have many limitations in prediction and
explanation.
C ongruity theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955) predicts that when a change
occurs, it is always tow ard greater congruity with dominant frames o f reference. The
theory is deem ed a special case o f balance theory since it specifically focuses on attitudes
a person holds tow ard sources o f inform ation and the objects o f the source’s assertions.
Congruity theory is perhaps the most limited consistency theory since it only relates to
attitude change (Shaw and Costanzo 1970). Hence, like balance theory, this particular
theory o f cognitive consistency does not provide a detailed account o f the b elief system,
which is a fundamental notion in this research endeavor.
Symmetry theory (Newcomb 1953) suggests that people attem pt to influence each
another to achieve a state o f equilibrium. The term ‘sym m etry’ is used to distinguish the
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theory from balance theory. Symmetry theory may be classified as a theory o f
interpersonal attraction that deals with communication among people. Thus, symmetry
theory is an inappropriate alternative for explaining consum ers’ cognitive and behavioral
responses to disconfirm ing evidence.
A ffective-cognitive

consistency

theory

(Rosenberg

1956)

explores

the

relationship between beliefs and attitudes and maintains that people need to have
coherence or stability between their cognitions and their attitudes toward certain objects
or situations. The theory predicts that persuasive efforts that change the cognitive
com ponent o f attitude will lead to a change in overall attitudes toward an object.
According to affective-cognitive consistency theory, people who have a high consistency
between the affective and cognitive com ponents o f their attitudes will exhibit a more
articulate and more stable disposition. On the other hand, people who have a low
consistency between the two attitudinal components will have less articulate and less
stable dispositions (Rosenberg 1968).
Affective-cognitive consistency theory is typically noted in studies o f attitude
polarization (e.g. Chaiken and Yates

1985). As will be argued shortly, attitude

polarization, as well as belief perseverance and illusory correlation, has links to
confirm ation bias and is rooted in the theory o f cognitive dissonance. Hence, dissonance
theory is conceived to be a more extensive, robust choice o f cognitive consistency theory
for this study.
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Cognitive Dissonance
O f the various cognitive consistency theories, cognitive dissonance appears a
dom inant theory since it is broad and deals with behavior in general, both social and
nonsocial (See Figure 2.1). First explored in detail by the social psychologist Leon
Festinger (1957), the theory o f cognitive dissonance is a theory o f hum an motivation
asserting that it is psychologically uncom fortable to hold contradictory cognitions. The
theory suggests that people have an inner drive to hold all o f their attitudes and their
beliefs in harm ony and to avoid disharm ony or dissonance.

Balance
Theory

Affective-Cognitive
Consistency

Cognitive
Dissonance

F ree Choice

Induced Compliance

A ttitu d e P o larizatio n

Betef Discaafinnation

Betef Perseverance

Figure 2.1 Theory Hierarchy o f B elief Perseverance

Hypocrisy

Illusory Correlation
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Therefore, dissonance, being unpleasant, motivates a person to change his
cognition, attitude, or behavior. Festinger proposed that cognitive inconsistency is the
underlying psychological motivation that is responsible for the various persuasion effects
o f cognitive dissonance. Put differently, cognitive inconsistency evokes m otivation to
reduce inconsistency. Consequently, cognitive dissonance theory was heavily criticized
for being a theory o f inconsistency (Singer 1966). Nevertheless, cognitive dissonance
theory has been and continues to be the most extensive o f the cognitive consistency
theories and highly regarded in consum er behavior and theories o f social psychology
(Shaw and Costanzo 1970).
Hunt (1970) provides a useful summary o f dissonance theory along with the
definition and descriptions o f cognitions (cited in p. 46):
1. Cognitions are the bits o f knowledge one has about himself, about his behavior,
and about his surroundings.
2. Two cognitions are in a dissonant state if, considering these two alone, the
obverse o f one cognition would follow from the other.
3. Two cognitions are consonant if one cognition does follow from the other.
4. Two cognitions are irrelevant if one cognition implies nothing at all concerning
the other.
Cognitive responses are defined as “any thoughts that arise during the process o f
elaboration when people relate m essage material to other message content or to their
preexisting knowledge and views stored in m em ory” (M eyers-Levy and M alaviya 1999,
47). Based on the definition and descriptions o f cognitions, Festinger (1957) describes
dissonance as a conflict situation between the knowledge o f reality that individuals
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perceive about themselves, their behaviors, and their surroundings.

Conversely,

consonance is described as a no-conflict, harmonious state. Thus, cognitive dissonance
theory is categorized into three parts (Festinger 1957): First, dissonance occurs when a
person’s attitudes contradict other attitudes or behaviors. Second, dissonance is an
aversive state; therefore, a person feels pressure to reduce the dissonance and prevent
future increases o f dissonance. And third, a person tries to reduce this aversive state
through changing behavior and cognition, and avoiding the introduction o f new
inform ation or opinions that could produce dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance arises in three prim ary ways (Loudon and Della Bitta 1993):
1. Any logical inconsistency can create a sense o f dissonance.
2. Dissonance occurs when people experience an inconsistency either between
their attitude versus their behavior or between two types o f their behavior.
3. Dissonance can take place when strongly held beliefs or expectations are
disconfirmed.
Interestingly, Hasan and Nasreen (2002) suggest that cognitive dissonance is not
automatic in each o f these modes o f dissonance provocation. For dissonance to occur, a
consum er m ust perceive the inconsistency.
In consum er behavior, the dominant view is that dissonance occurs once a
decision has been made. For example, before m aking a decision choice, consum ers still
have the option o f adjusting their purchase behavior to match their given attitude toward
a product, brand, or service. However, a com mitment is established between consumers
and sellers when consumers have made their final decision. Thus, the restriction o f
having made a buyer-seller com m itm ent does not allow consum ers to adjust their
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behavior further and forces them to stick to their decision. The described situation may
eventually bring about feelings o f dissonance for consumers, especially when they are not
pleased with their decision choice after purchase (e.g. buyer’s remorse).
To summarize, dissonance and consonance are relations among a person’s
cognitions that can be am ong opinions, beliefs, knowledge o f one’s environm ent, and
knowledge o f one's own actions and feelings. Consonance exists when two opinions,
beliefs, or items o f know ledge are consistent and fit with each other. On the other hand,
dissonance is invoked when two opinions, beliefs, or items o f knowledge are inconsistent
or do not fit together. Festinger (1957, 1964) mentioned three ways (not mutually
exclusive) that a person m ight try to cope with instances o f cognitive dissonance:
1. Changing consonant factors (e.g. by changing one or more o f the beliefs,
opinions, or behaviors involved in the dissonance).
2. Adding consonant factors (e.g. by obtaining new inform ation or acquiring new
beliefs that will increase the existing consonance to help reduce the total
dissonance).
3. Lowering the importance o f dissonant factors (e.g. by reducing and perhaps
forgetting the importance o f dissonant cognitions).

Self as Information Processing Filter
Aronson (1968) m odified dissonance theory by em phasizing the role o f the self.
He declared that “ [if] dissonance exists, then it is the result o f cognitions inconsistent
with the self-concept” (1968, 23). Robins, Tracy, and Trzesniewski (2008) proposed that
the two aspects o f the self, i.e. self-awareness and self-representation, are evolved
m echanism s that serve four adaptive functions: self-regulation, inform ation processing
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filter, understanding others, and identity formation. They suggest that these four functions
have helped people to survive, reproduce, and attain social status and acceptance in
increasingly com plex social environments. W ith regards to the self as an informationprocessing filter, it is virtually impossible for people to attend to and encode all o f the
inform ation that is constantly bom barding them. Hence, the self attends to this problem
by serving as a filter, or lens, through which people experience the world around them.
People’s self-representations consist o f cognitive structures, or schemas, that organize
and direct the processing o f information. Therefore, Robins, Tracy, and Trzesniewski
(2008) suggest that the self serves as a top-down information filter that is guided by four
basic motives: accuracy, consistency, popularity (i.e., social status and acceptance), and
enhancement. These basic motives are purported to influence which inform ation the self
attends to, encodes, retrieves, and acts upon. They describe the motivational orientations
in terms o f four metaphors: the scientist, the politician, the egotist, and the consistency
seeker.
The scientist m etaphor illustrates people’s desire to obtain accurate information
about themselves and the world, i.e. striving for “truth” . The politician m etaphor suggests
that people try to present themselves in ways that make the best im pressions on others to
enhance their own social status and acceptance. The egotist m etaphor entails that people
narcissistically distort inform ation to enhance their own self-worth. The consistency
seeker metaphor, according to Swann (1997), describes people as striving to see
themselves in a consistent manner by confirm ing their preexisting self-views regardless
o f reality.
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Robins, Tracy, and Trzesniewski (2008) contend that there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that a person may actively seek out and create contexts in which his/her self
view will be confirm ed even when these views are inaccurate or negative. One can
clearly see how the functions o f the self in general and the motivations for the self as an
inform ation processing filter in particular can be used to explain the reality o f
confirm ation bias and incidences o f b elief perseverance. Hence, consistency seeking may
cause people to make serious inform ation processing errors, but this blunder is purported
to be a useful and efficient heuristic for people living in increasingly com plex social
environments.
W hat does all o f that mean for the interaction between buyer and seller? In the
contem porary marketplace, consumers are faced with a plethora o f inform ation on the
seemingly endless choices o f available products and services. Faced with such huge
display choices, consumers could forgo a deeper cognitive reasoning to save time and,
instead, rely more on habits or heuristics to make a quick, thoughtless choice. This
presents a m ajor problem when marketers need to com municate new information
containing substantial evidence that would change consum er belief-expectancies.

Research Paradigm s o f Cognitive Dissonance
Harmon-Jones (2002) discusses four research paradigm s that have been used to
exam ine

cognitive

dissonance

processes:

Free

Choice

(Brehm

1956),

Induced

Com pliance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), B elief Disconfirmation (Festinger, Riecken,
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and Schachter, 1956), and Hypocrisy (Aronson, Fried, and Stone, 1991). See Figure 2.1
for a depiction o f these paradigms o f dissonance research in relation to confirm ation bias
and b elief perseverance.

Free Choice Paradigm
People make all kind o f decisions on a daily basis. Festinger (1957) asserted that
decision-m aking almost always provokes dissonance. Once a person makes a decision to
choose one alternative over another, he/she will have to cope with the cognitive elements
concerning the attractive attributes o f the rejected alternatives.
The free choice paradigm (Brehm 1956) focuses on this notion that dissonance is
provoked in decision-m aking and that harder (easier) decisions stim ulate more (less)
dissonance. This affective-m otivational state o f dissonance is lessened by viewing the
selected (not selected) alternative or choice as more (less) desirable, i.e. the “spreading o f
the alternatives.”
Changing o n e’s behavior is one o f the ways to reduce dissonance that can occur
from m aking a decision (Festinger, 1964). Consequently, behavior change can often be
very difficult to do. For that reason, people might em ploy various mental maneuvers
instead o f changing their behavior. In the free choice paradigm, the “spreading o f the
alternatives” refers to one o f these common mental maneuvers to reduce dissonance.
Thus, people reduce their dissonance from

decision m aking by increasing the

attractiveness o f a chosen alternative and decreasing the attractiveness o f a rejected
alternative.
One o f the pioneering studies to examine the relationship between dissonance and
decision-m aking was conducted by Brehm (1956). Female subjects were inform ed that
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they would be helping out in a study funded by several manufacturers. They were also
inform ed that they would receive one o f the products at the end o f the experim ent as
com pensation. Eight household products, including an automatic coffee maker, an
electric sandwich grill, an automatic toaster, and a portable radio, were rated on their
desirability. The products ranged in price from $15 to $30.
Subjects in the control group were given one o f the products. Hence, these
subjects did not have any dissonance to reduce since they did not have to make a
decision. Subjects in the low-dissonance group were asked to choose between a desirable
product and a less desirable one that was rated three points lower on an 8-point Likert
scale. In the high-dissonance treatm ent group, subjects were asked to choose between a
highly desirable product and one rated ju st a point lower on the same scale. The subjects
were asked to rate the products once more after reading reports about the household
products.
Behm (1956) found that subjects in the high-dissonance group were significantly
more likely to increase the attractiveness o f the chosen alternative and to decrease the
attractiveness o f the not chosen alternative than subjects in the other two treatm ent
groups (low -dissonance and control). Thus, Behm (1956) provided support for “spreading
o f the alternatives” by subjects in the high-dissonance condition.
As discussed previously, decision-m aking involves the rejection o f alternatives.
Thus, cognitive dissonance theory predicts

that consum er decision-m aking will

sometimes lead to post-purchase dissonance. Two factors determ ine the possibility and
the extent o f the dissonance experienced from making a decision: the im portance o f the
decision and the relative attractiveness o f the rejected alternative (O shikaw a 1969). More
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specifically, consum er decisions o f greater (lesser) importance and more (less) attractive
rejected alternatives will lead to greater (lesser) dissonance. A ccording to Oshikawa
(1969), a variation o f dissonance theory suggests that consumers who consider a greater
(lesser) num ber o f alternatives and/or alternatives with more (less) equal positive and
negative attributes before purchase will experience greater (lesser) post-purchase
dissonance.
Induced Compliance Paradigm
The induced, or forced, com pliance paradigm (Festinger and Carlsm ith, 1959)
assumes that dissonance occurs when an individual does or says som ething that
contradicts his or her prior belief or attitude. Thus, people sometimes behave in a m anner
that is inconsistent with their beliefs. W hy would a person behave this way? He/she may
be induced to do so via external justifications such as certain prom ises o f reward or
threats o f punishment. Greater dissonance is the result o f a person’s contradictory actions
when these external justifications are few and unim portant (and vice-versa).
For example, people sometimes find themselves in a situation where they are
publicly forced to do something that they privately do not want to do. W hen that happens,
dissonance is created between a person’s cognition and a person’s behavior, i.e. “ I did not
want to do this” versus “ I did it.” Since the behavior is irreversible, dissonance may be
reduced by re-evaluating attitudes toward the behavior.
In an interesting experiment, Festinger and Carlsm ith (1959) investigated if
cognitive dissonance could be created through induced com pliance behavior by forcing
people to perform a dull task. To create a series o f very boring tasks, Festinger and
Carlsm ith (1959) requested male subjects to put pegs in a peg board and rem ove them for
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30 minutes. Then, the subjects were asked to turn pegs clockwise for another 30 minutes.
Needless to say, subjects’ attitudes toward these tasks were extrem ely negative.
Afterward, the subjects were paid either $1 or $20 to tell a waiting participant that the
boring tasks were really interesting, i.e. to tell a lie. The control group was not paid or
asked to lie. Virtually all o f the subjects told the lie that the boring experim ent was
enjoyable and fun. Lastly, subjects were asked to rate the dull tasks on enjoym ent to
reveal how they coped with their dissonance.
Festinger and Carlsm ith (1959) predicted that subjects would suffer dissonance
due to the contradiction between their negative attitudes o f the boring task and their
actions (lying). The experimenters found that subjects in the control group and the $20
dollar group rated the tasks as boring. On the other hand, subjects in the $ 1 group rated
the dull tasks as significantly more interesting and enjoyable.
Results from Festinger and C arlsm ith’s (1959) study revealed that subjects who
received $1 to lie resolved the dissonance created by their initial negative attitudes
toward the boring task and their actions by rating the experim ent as pleasant. Since the
high m onetary rew ard justified their actions o f dishonesty, subjects who received $20 did
not experience as much dissonance. Hence, Festinger and Carlsm ith (1959) suggested
that, due to the lack o f a strong external reward, subjects in the $1 group were forced to
change their attitudes to relieve the cognitive tension caused by the conflict between their
attitudes and behaviors.
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In a true m arket setting, a consum er is not forced to make a purchase. Consum ers
will try their best not to behave in ways which they know will later arouse dissonance.
Hence, the induced com pliance paradigm o f research is not likely to cause consum ers to
experience post-purchase dissonance (Oshikawa, 1969).
B e lie f Disconfirmation Paradigm
The b elief disconfirm ation paradigm (Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956)
proposes that dissonance arises when people are exposed to inform ation that is
inconsistent with their beliefs. Dissonance can be reduced by changing previously held
beliefs. For people who do not change their beliefs, the unresolved dissonance may lead
to

1) m isperceiving or m isinterpreting inform ation, 2) rejecting or refuting the

inform ation, 3) looking for support from those who agree with them or have the same
belief, and 4) trying to persuade others to accept their belief.
Adams (1961) conducted an experim ent to test two hypotheses concerning the
reduction o f cognitive dissonance by seeking information. The first hypothesis predicts
that people exposed to disconfirm ing opinions are more likely to seek information
compared to people exposed to compatible, confirm ing com munication. The second
hypothesis predicts that people exposed to disconfirm ing com m unication tend to seek
confirm ing opinions from other sources. In the study by Adams (1961), opinions were
gathered

from

m others

regarding

the

perceived

importance

o f hereditary

and

environm ental factors in raising children. The subjects were then exposed to substantial
com munication that advocated either a hereditary or an environm ental point o f view. The
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results supported the first hypothesis but failed to support the second hypothesis. Thus,
people exposed to b elief disconfirm ations m ay experience an increased level cognitive
dissonance which in turn causes them to search for additional information.
M any factors come into play in determining w hether disconfirm ing evidence will
arouse consum er dissonance. According to Oshikaw a (1969), the m ost im portant o f these
factors is the degree o f com m itm ent and ego-involvement. For exam ple, when a
consum er makes a perceived good choice and publicly com mits to that choice, he or she
will experience even greater dissonance when exposed to disconfirm ing information.
Some research suggests that dissonance is unlikely to arise when the degree o f
public ego-involvem ent is low and when disconfirm ing inform ation is not salient (Cohen,
Brehm, and Latane 1959; Rosen 1961). Cohen, Brehm, and Latane (1959) argued that
m aking a public com m itm ent leads to ego-involvement. Consequently, this egoinvolvem ent increases the im portance o f the consonant cognitive elements on which
people base their choices, m aking them even more committed. Hence, m aking public
com m itm ents can increase the magnitude o f dissonance by also increasing the importance
o f peoples’ dissonant cognitions.
Rosen (1961) exam ined the effect o f cognitive dissonance on opinion-seeking
behavior and suggested that people tend to seek the opinions o f others regardless o f their
own opinions. Results revealed that roughly two-thirds o f the subjects who were asked to
make private decisions (w ithout announcing publicly) sought dissonance-producing
inform ation regarding their decisions. The rem aining one-third o f the subjects sought
dissonance-reducing information. The behavior o f the latter group coincides more with
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predictions that would be made by the confirm ation bias. In addition, Rosen suggested
that the tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance relates to the tendency to avoid risks.
Hypocrisy Paradigm
In the hypocrisy research paradigm (Aronson, Fried, and Stone, 1991), people are
induced to make a public attitudinally consistent statement and are then reminded o f all
the times they did not “practice what they preach.” Dissonance is reduced either by acting
in accordance to the statement or by changing their attitudes to be more consistent with
past behavior. Fried (1998) suggested that the chosen option depends on w hether the
recent statem ent or past behavior was more resistant to change.
Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) conducted an experim ent that asked sexually
active young adults to develop a speech prom oting the use o f condom s from a set o f
facts. The speech was supposedly intended for AIDS prevention o f high school students.
The subjects were random ly assigned either to “preach” or “no preach” conditions. That
is, they either delivered the speech in front o f a television camera, or they silently
rehearsed the speech without actually delivering it.
Subjects in the “high m indful” conditions were asked to fully described occasions
in their past when they had unprotected sex. The other h alf o f the subjects in the “ low
m indful” conditions sim ply preached or did not preach (silently rehearsed) without any
reference to their own sexual behavior. Lastly, the subjects reported their level o f condom
use in the past as well as their level o f intention to use condom s in the future.
Results from the experim ent indicated that subjects in the hypocrisy condition
(preach/high mindful) reported the highest levels o f previous risk behavior, i.e. failure to
use condom s in the past. Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) argued that their procedure to
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induce hypocrisy had enabled subjects to overcom e denial. This finding is interesting
because it is contrary to predictions from dissonance theory. The young adults in the
hypocrisy group should have felt the greatest dissonance-based pressure to under rate
their risk behavior.
A ceiling effect was seen when subjects in all conditions reported strong intention
to use condom s in the future. Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) called subjects three
months after the experim ent and asked them to report recent condom use. Even though
many o f the subjects could not be located, a considerable difference in the size o f means
was found. Consequently, the researchers argued that hypocrisy induction m ight be the
most effective route to long-term changes in behavior.
O f the four research paradigms o f cognitive dissonance discussed, the belief
disconfirm ation paradigm is epitomized by the confirm ation bias. As seen in Figure 2.1,
in addition to belief perseverance, confirm ation bias is also used to explain attitude
polarization and illusory correlation.

Attitude Polarization
Attitude polarization is the phenom enon in which a difference o f opinions among
people becom es more extreme as separate parties consider evidence on a particular issue.
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) exposed subjects that supported or opposed capital
punishm ent to two case studies that confirm ed and disconfirm ed their existing beliefs
about how effective the death penalty is as a crime deterrence. The researchers found that
subjects' decisions about w hether to accept a study's findings at face value or to search for
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flaws and consider alternative interpretations depended far more on w hether the study's
results coincided with their existing beliefs than on the particular procedure em ployed in
the study.

Illusory Correlation
Illusory correlation is the perception o f a relationship between two variables
which, in reality, does not exist (Peeters 1983). Hamilton and Rose (1980) conducted a
series o f three experiments to test the notion o f illusory correlation in the context o f
stereotypes. Subjects were asked to read sets o f sentences that contained pairs o f trait
adjectives to describe people o f different occupations. For instance, a doctor is described
using consistent trait adjectives such as "thoughtful" and "wealthy," while a stewardess is
described in the same stereotypical m anner using the words "attractive" and "comforting"
as consistent trait adjectives.
In the first two experiments, the trait adjectives were either consistent with
occupational stereotypes or not related to the stereotype. The researchers found that
subjects overestim ated inform ation congruent with their stereotypic expectations even
though the frequency o f the consistent and unrelated trait adjectives was the same. In the
third experiment, Hamilton and Rose (1980) conducted a sim ilar design em ploying
inconsistent (instead o f consistent) and unrelated trait adjectives. Results revealed that
subjects estimated that inconsistent trait adjectives occurred significantly less frequently
than unrelated traits. Thus, subjects’ assessm ents were once again biased toward
maintaining their existing stereotype beliefs.
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C onsum er Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance has been studied extensively across disciplines, particularly
in the realm o f post-purchase consum er behavior (Ehrlich et al. 1957; Bell 1967; Hunt
1970; Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar 2000). Consumer dissonance, in particular, has
becom e a focal point for m arketing researchers. For exam ple, m arketing research has
exam ined the interplay between dissonance and brand loyalty (Cohen and Houston 1972),
cognitive effect o f advertisements post-purchase (Engel 1963), and the im pact on service
quality perceptions (O'Neill and Palm er 2004). Thus, a review o f some key marketing
research findings on post-purchase dissonance is warranted.
Straits (1964) illustrates that dissonance can be provoked in consumers in two
ways; post-decision and via cognitive intrusion. Consumers faced with m aking a choice
among m any alternatives often weigh the advantages and disadvantages o f each. After
m aking a decision, consumers may experience cognitive discom fort if disequilibrium
exists between the chosen and rejected alternatives. For example, a consum er may prefer
and buy a high-perform ance sports car, but still value the extra space that could have
been afforded by a larger car. Thus, in this case, either choice carries opportunity costs
that may evolve into dissonance (Straits 1964).
Similarly, cognitive intrusion m ay create dissonance for consumers. When
consumers are exposed to new information that contradicts their current behavior, they
may experience dissonance as a result. For exam ple, anti-sm oking cam paigns aim to
intrude on the psyche o f smokers or potential smokers by presenting additional evidence
o f the harm ful effects o f tobacco products. The mental discom fort form ed from the
discrepant inform ation is intended to discourage future consum ption o f tobacco products.
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Bell (1967) examined consum ers’ feelings o f dissonance (buyer’s remorse)
following the purchase o f a new car. The researchers conducted personal interviews with
new car buyers ranging from one to eight days after the car purchase. Contrary to
previous studies, B ell’s (1967) findings did not provide im mediate support for an
association between persuasibility and cognitive dissonance. However, once a control
was set in place for the self-confidence o f buyers, Bell (1967) found significant
relationships between persuasibility and cognitive dissonance. That is, car buyers with
high (low) self-confidence exhibited high (low) levels o f dissonance if they were easily
persuaded to buy a car. Moreover, car buyers who perceived that they received high
quality o f service experienced less cognitive dissonance. More specifically, buyers who
were m oderately persuaded received the worst service, and consequently, these buyers
are the ones who experienced the most cognitive dissonance. Bell (1967) suggests that
highly confident buyers generally prefer to make their own decisions, and dissonance
may arise if they perceive coercion in the buying experience. Customers with low selfconfidence may need to rely on salespeople to help them make decisions, and dissonance
can arise afterward as a result.
In recent research by Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar (2000), results indicate
that cognitive dissonance contains both cognitive and psychological (or emotional)
components. They define the cognitive aspect as “a person’s recognition that beliefs are
inconsistent with a decision after the purchase has been m ade” (2000, 374). The
em otional aspect o f cognitive dissonance is defined as “a person’s psychological
discom fort subsequent to the purchase decision” (2000, 375). Sweeney et al.’s (2000)
cognitive dissonance after purchase scale contains three dim ensions. One o f the
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dim ensions is emotional, while the other two dim ensions (wisdom o f purchase and
concern over deal) are cognitive. The authors describe wisdom o f purchase as the
consum er post-purchase recognition that he/she did not need the product or did not
choose the right one. On the other hand, ‘concern over d eal’ is the post-purchase
perception that salespeople m ight have influenced the purchase decision in a w ay that is
against the custom er’s own beliefs.
For the m ost part, previous (and subsequent) m arketing research on cognitive
dissonance has been limited to dissonance in post-purchase situations. However,
dissonance for a consum er may also arise prior to making a decision. For example,
consider a consum er that holds strong beliefs about a particular product (or service,
brand, etc.) and has been continually buying the product based on this belief. Dissonance
may occur if the consum er is exposed to disconfirm ing evidence regarding his/her
product beliefs, particularly if this inform ation originates from a credible source. How is
a consum er to react?
A rational consum er may react to disconfirm ing evidence by changing his/her
beliefs and buying behavior. However, according to Edward Cham berlin (1957, 60),
“there is no reason to assume that human beings always act perfectly rationally; indeed,
there is good reason not to assume it.” Godden (2012), am ong others, contended that
belief perseverance is an irrational behavior. Thus, it is extremely difficult to predict the
reactions and the behaviors o f an individual consumer. Due to confirm ation bias, a
consum er’s beliefs may persist despite the exposure to new, considerable disconfirm ing
information. W hat is the reason for this irrationality and perseverance o f beliefs? Can
belief perseverance still have an effect on the consum er’s ensuing purchase behavior?

35

Individuals resist changing their attitudes because o f an inherent com m itm ent to
that attitude. Pomerantz, Chaiken, and Tordesillas (1995) argue that people who are
com m itted to a certain attitude feel confident that their attitude is correct and tend to
vigorously defend their position. Hence, people with such firm stances are less likely to
change their attitudes. Results from this study reveal that deeply held com m itm ents or
beliefs may trigger resistance m echanism s that reject contradicting evidence when
presented. Similarly, it may be that consumers that are highly involved with a
product/brand/service may discount the credibility o f any inform ation that contradicts
their belief system.

Beliefs, A ttitudes, and Knowledge
The relationship between consum er thought and actions has captivated marketing
researchers for decades. Accumulated evidence suggests that consum er beliefs and
attitudes have a direct impact on purchase behaviors (Seines and G ranhaug 1986; Feick,
Park, and M othersbaugh 1992). Beliefs represent consum ers’ perceived probability o f
existence regarding some distinguishable aspect o f the world encom passing their
subjective understanding o f themselves and their environm ent (Fishbein and Ajzen
1975). The authors propose that reasoned action is driven by subjective judgm ents
regarding the likelihood o f a relationship between a b elief and some other object, value,
concept, or attribute. A person’s salient beliefs are those that are activated from memory
and considered important in a given context. Thus, attitudes are expressed as a function
o f a person’s salient beliefs in a given situation.
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), there are three different processes that
underlie b elief formation. These processes entail the formation o f descriptive, inferential,
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and inform ational beliefs. A descriptive belief is described as a perceived relationship
between the object o f a b elief and some object (O and X, respectively) that is established
via direct observation. An inferential belief is described as a link between O and X that is
established via a process o f inference from another belief about O. Lastly, an information
belief is described as a link between O and X that develops via pertinent inform ation that
may be accepted from an outside source (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).
The summary o f associations can help illustrate the theory o f reasoned action in a
simple manner: Beliefs o Attitudes ^ Intentions ■=> Behavior. For example, think about
the statement: “we intend to help people we like.” If we believe that som eone is a good
person, then we will have a favorable attitude toward that person. As a result, we will
have greater intentions to help that person should the need arise. Finally, the greater our
intentions are to help, the more likely we are to actually help that person. Not
surprisingly, typical marketing studies based on the theory o f reasoned action focus
m ainly on consum er beliefs regarding product attributes and subsequent consum er
attitudes toward brands and intentions to buy.
The theory o f planned behavior (Ajzen 1988) suggests that the com bination o f
three factors, i.e. attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral
control, lead to the formation o f a behavioral intention, and this intention is presumed to
be a direct antecedent o f behavior. The theory o f planned behavior differs from the theory
o f reasoned action in that it includes perceived behavioral control as an additional
determ inant o f intentions and behavior. Thus, the theory o f reasoned action (predecessor
theory) is a reduced version o f the theory o f planned behavior and is appropriate when
perceived behavioral control is inappropriate to the context at hand.
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Both o f these theories, i.e. the theory o f reasoned action and the theory o f planned
behavior, are rooted in the expectancy-value model. This model makes three fundamental
predictions (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Firstly, people react to new inform ation about
som ething by developing a belief about that something. Secondly, people assign certain
values to each attribute that their b elief is based on. Thirdly, people form or m odify their
belief-expectancies based on their subjective assessm ent o f value. Observe that the
expectancy-value model assumes that existing beliefs can and m ost likely will be
m odified by new information. As mentioned previously, this is not the same prediction
that can be made in the case o f b elief perseverance. Due to the confirm ation bias,
adam ant consum ers will more than likely dismiss novel inform ation that is contrary to
their beliefs.

Subjective vs. Objective Knowledge
Brucks (1985) identifies three categories o f consum er product class knowledge:
subjective knowledge, objective knowledge, and prior experience. Subjective knowledge
is the consum er’s perception o f how much he or she knows, i.e. self-rated or self-assessed
knowledge. Objective know ledge is what a consum er actually knows. Finally, prior
experience pertains to a consum er’s previous purchasing or usage experience with the
product.
According to Brucks (1985), the prior experience category is inconsistent with the
inform ation processing paradigm. The inform ation processing paradigm m aintains that
only an experience that results in differences in m emory can affect behavior. Behaviors
are likely to vary from one consum er to the next since consumers can learn different
things from sim ilar experiences. Hence, Brucks (1985) argues that measures o f subjective
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and objective knowledge are more directly linked to behavior com pared to measures o f
knowledge based on prior experience. Additionally, she declares that this is particularly
true for product classes in which habit is not a m ajor factor.
Various researchers have shown that a consum er’s subjective knowledge and
objective knowledge do not necessarily correlate in a perfect m anner (Seines and
G ranhaug 1986; Klerck and Sweeney 2007). Consequently, measures o f subjective and
objective know ledge can have very different effects on inform ation processing and
subsequent purchase behavior. Thus, researchers have recom m ended that close attention
should be given to the differences between each o f these measures (Seines and G ranhaug
1986; Klerck and Sweeney 2007). More specifically, the appropriate m easure should be
selected according to the focus o f the research. For instance, Seines and G ranhaug 1986
argue that subjective knowledge measures are preferable when concentrating on
m otivational aspects o f product knowledge. On the other hand, objective knowledge
measures, they argue, are more appropriate for studies that focus on ability differences o f
consumers.
Demographic variables can be influential factors in shaping a consum er’s
knowledge. For example, researchers have found that higher levels o f education are
positively related to higher levels o f organic food knowledge (Ellen 1994; Gracia and De
M agistris 2007). In addition, following an exam ination o f the relationship between
knowledge and pro-ecological behaviors, Ellen (1994) found that higher income and
younger age are positively related to both subjective and objective knowledge.
Researchers have suggested that subjective knowledge, in com parison to objective
knowledge, offers a stronger m otivation for subsequent purchase behavior (Seines and
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G ranhaug 1986; Feick, Park, and M othersbaugh 1992). For exam ple, Chryssochoidis
(2000) and G racia and De M agistris (2007) found that consumers with higher levels o f
subjective know ledge o f organic food have significantly greater intentions to buy organic
food. G racia and De M agistris (2007) argue that a consum er’s know ledge is the only tool
available to differentiate organic product attributes from conventional product attributes
and to form positive attitudes toward the organic product category. Consum ers with weak
perceived self-com petence in a particular product category will feel incapable o f m aking
a good choice. As a result, these consumers will probably shy away from that product
category all together (Chryssochoidis 2000). Results in Thogersen (2007) support this
notion by revealing that consum er uncertainty has direct, negative effects on intentions to
buy organic food and on actual purchasing o f organic food.
To summarize, objective knowledge and subjective knowledge are term s used to
differentiate between a consum er’s actual knowledge and a consum er’s assessm ent o f his
or her knowledge, respectively. Objective knowledge exists as accurately stored
inform ation, while subjective knowledge refers to self-beliefs about the consum er’s own
know ledge (M oorm an et al. 2004). This dissertation focuses on the subjective beliefs o f
consumers. That is, the study will attempt to provoke consum ers’ subjective beliefs with
disconfirm ing evidence in order to exam ine these potentially significant effects on
purchase-related behavioral intentions o f the consumers.

Persuasion Models and Inoculation Theory
There are num erous models o f persuasion known to marketing. Examples o f
com mon persuasion models include the Elaboration Likelihood M odel (Petty, Cacioppo
and Schumann

1983), the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken

1980), and the
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Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and W right 1994). A ccording to M eyers-Levy
and M alaviya (1999), persuasion does not necessarily rest within inform ation; rather,
successful persuasion depends on the mental processes invoked by information. Hence,
persuasion models have much to offer in exam ining b elief change but have little to offer
in regards to answering the “w hy” question in the case o f b elief perseverance. That is,
persuasion models such as the aforem entioned ELM, HSM, and PKM can provide
explanations for instances o f belief change but fail to explain why people do not modify
their beliefs in the presence o f disconfirm ing (and convincing) evidence.
Inoculation theory (M cGuire 1961) is a theory that explains how to keep original
beliefs consistent in the face o f counterarguments. Hence, the theory is essentially
opposite to persuasion. That is, unlike traditional persuasion m odels, inoculation theory
does not focus on describing the processes that lead to persuasion. Instead, the theory
focuses on explaining how people can build a resistance to persuasive influence.
M cGuire (1961) suggested that beliefs and attitudes that are com m only held and seldom
attacked would be m ost vulnerable to attack, because people would be unprepared to
defend them. He called these ubiquitously shared beliefs “cultural truism s” (Szabo and
Pfau 2002).
A ccording to Szabo and Pfau (2002), inoculation theory is founded on the notion
o f selective exposure. Therefore, the theory has a fundamental relation to cognitive
confirm ation bias and perhaps an insightful one as well. As m entioned previously,
confirm ation bias deals with biased search, interpretation, and memory. Selective
exposure, like confirm ation bias, assumes that people will be attracted to information
that supports their beliefs/attitudes, and they will purposely avoid inform ation that
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disagrees with their beliefs/attitudes (Szabo and Pfau 2002). One can see how the two
terms, i.e. confirm ation bias and selective exposure, have sometimes been used
interchangeably in research.
Inoculation theory assumes that counterargum ents that challenge people’s beliefs
and attitudes will threaten them. Thus, the theory consists o f two main components:
threat and refutational preem ption (Szabo and Pfau, 2002). The threat is what motivates
a person to protect his or her beliefs and attitudes. Refutational preem ption involves
activating a person’s argum ent against systematic belief attacks and strengthening (or
inoculating, immunizing, etc.) his or her existing beliefs via expression.
Researchers have dem onstrated the usefulness o f inoculation techniques for the
betterm ent o f society (Pfau, Bockem and King 1992; Goldbold and Pfau 2000;
Compton and Pfau 2004). Pfau, Bockem and Kang (1992) used inoculation to promote a
resistance to start sm oking in adolescent children. Godbold and Pfau (2000) showed that
the inoculation approach can be used to lower the effects o f peer pressure and early
alcohol consumption. Compton and Pfau (2004) employed the inoculation technique to
help protect college students against the dangers o f credit card abuse.
Inoculation techniques o f building im munity to persuasion can perhaps be applied
in circum stances o f belief disconfirm ation to create a more favorable reception o f
beneficial counterarguments. For example, research shows that people drastically
underestimate caloric content o f food from so called “healthy” fast-food chains (e.g.
Subway) com pared to other restaurants (e.g. M cD onald’s) (Chandon and W ansink,
2007). In fact, consum ers estimated that 1,000-calorie Subway meal contains over 20%
less calories than a 1,000-calorie meal at M cDonald's. Therefore, people are more likely
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to feel more at ease to order additional side dishes and/or desserts at a “healthy”
restaurant com pared to one that is perceived as not so healthy. This phenom enon is
com m only referred to as the “health halo.” Chandon and W ansink (2007) suggest that the
harmful effect o f health halos can be dim inished by sim ply asking people to reflect on
w hether the opposite o f such health claims are true. Perhaps this technique can be applied
to help overcome instances o f erroneous b elief perseverance.

Assim ilation-C ontrast Theory
Assim ilation-contrast theorists assert that consum ers’ susceptibility to belief
change depends on their latitudes o f acceptance and rejection to various stands on the
issue (Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif 1957). For instance, consum ers tend to assimilate or
accept (contrast or reject) advertised prices based on correspondence with their internal
price range. Olson and Dover (1976) argue that cognitive dissonance theory and
assim ilation contrast theory generally make the same predictions but tend to produce
differing predictions for belief disconfirm ations o f great magnitude. Inductive reasoning
suggests that for most consum er products, usage experience would not create the extreme
disconfirm ations required to produce a contrast effect. Olson and Dover (1976) concur
that beliefs may change after a disconfirm ing experience and are likely to be triggered by
dissonance reduction rather than processes o f assimilation. M oreover, the result o f
contrast is that preexisting beliefs persist unchanged in the face o f new evidence.

Product Involvem ent
Product involvem ent is the general level o f interest in a product, or the centrality
o f a product to the person’s ego-structure (Day 1970). In other words, product
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involvem ent simply refers to the attributes linked to a certain product that are pertinent to
a consumer. These attributes can include num erous aspects o f the product including its
importance, meanings, value, relationship strength, and level o f psychological or
affective connection (Howard and Sheth 1969; Laurent and Kapferer 1985). For exam ple,
a product may be more important to or provide more m eaning and value for one
consum er com pared to another consumer. Thus, the strength o f the relationship between a
particular product and a consum er may vary significantly.
A ccording to Laurent and K apferer (1985), simple predictions can be made
regarding the effects o f involvement on consum er behavior. In general, consum ers who
are highly involved are expected to engage in various pre-purchase behaviors like active
search,

extensive

evaluation

o f alternatives,

and

active

inform ation

processing.

Conversely, there should be much less anticipation for low involvem ent consumers to
exhibit the same rigorous pre-purchase behavior.
Product involvement may produce different effects depending on consum er
income levels. Gbadamosi (2009) conducted a focus group discussion and 30 in-depth
interviews with low-incom e female consumers who engage in habitual purchasing. Based
on qualitative findings, Gbadamosi (2009) purports that low involvem ent products
yielded greater post consumption cognitive dissonance com pared to high involvement
products. Thus, purchases involving high-price products such as refrigerators and
autom obiles are not the only type o f instances that can yield dissonance.

Perceived Value
Perceived value is “the consum er’s overall assessm ent o f the utility o f a product
based on perceptions o f what is received and what is given’’ (Zeithaml 1988, 12).
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Perceived value is so significant to custom ers that it has been coined “the fundamental
basis for all marketing activity” (Holbrook 1994, 22). Research suggests that high value
perception is one o f the primary m otivations for custom er patronage. For exam ple, results
from Chang and W ildt (1994) and Gogoi (2013) support the notion that perceived value
is a key factor influencing purchase intentions. Hence, it is no surprise that a focus on
value creation has been strongly linked to subsequent profits and loyalty (Khalifa 2004).
Ever since the emergence o f Vargo and Lusch’s (2008) service-dom inant logic
and its core notion o f service as the fundamental basis o f exchange, few er researchers are
considering value as it specifically relates to marketing theory and practice. According to
a review by Babin and Jam es (2010), value has been inauspiciously overlooked by other
com m only researched outcomes such as satisfaction and loyalty. The key concept o f
value in m arketing research is too critical to be ignored, particularly in this study.
Research suggests that perceived value can be considered both unidim ensional
and multi-faceted in its makeup (Sanchez-Fem andez and Iniesta-Bonillo 2007). The
unidimensional perspective views perceived value as a simple trade-off between benefits
received and the sacrifices made to obtain such benefits (e.g. see Z eitham l’s definition).
O ther researchers argue that perceived value is a complex, multidim ensional construct
because, in addition to benefits and sacrifices, a variety o f other notions such as perceived
quality, price, affect, and social aspects are undeniably embedded in conceptualizations
o f value (Holbrook 1994; Babin, Darden and Griffin 1994; Sweeney and Soutar 2001).
Sanchez-Fem andez and

Iniesta-Bonillo (2007) suggest that both perspectives o f

perceived value play a role in providing simplified (unidim ensional) and com plex (m ulti
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dim ensional) understandings o f the value concept. However, the researchers conclude
that the nature o f perceived value is complex and multidimensional.
C onsum ers’ perceived value o f an offering is likely to be affected when exposed
to substantial evidence that would influence their beliefs regarding that offering. For
example, a custom er’s perceived value o f some product will probably be reinforced if the
custom er’s product beliefs are confirmed. Conversely, if that same custom er comes
across substantial evidence that disconfirm s his or her product beliefs, the custom er’s
perceived value o f that product will conceivably diminish.

Research Hypotheses and Model
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that a person exposed to disconfirm ing
evidence tends to becom e more convinced that his or her original b elief is correct and
may exhibit a greater preference for the original b elief (O shikawa 1970). That is,
invoking dissonance via exposure to discrepant evidence m ay not only lead to belief
perseverance, but may lead to belief enhancem ent as well. Nonetheless, a person exposed
to stronger disconfirm ing evidence will likely recognize greater conflict between that
evidence and his or her beliefs. Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) suggest that people who
hold strong beliefs about something are apt to exam ine relevant evidence in a biased
manner. Due to the confirm ation bias, people with firmly held beliefs are likely to accept
confirm ing evidence at face value, but they will subject any disconfirm ing evidence to
highly critical evaluation.
Findings in Chang (2011) suggest that claim

believability mediates the

relationship between discom fort and subsequent brand attitudes. That is, discounting
m essage believability m ay be a coping mechanism or a dissonance reduction technique
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that alleviates psychological discomfort. These findings do not com e as a surprise since
previous research suggests that consumers who experience inconsistency between their
beliefs and new evidence may be less affected if they discredit the evidence in the first
place (Anderson, Lepper, and Ross 1980). If the evidence presented is perceived as being
unbiased and credible (i.e. strong), then a higher level o f b elief disconfirm ation and
cognitive dissonance is expected. Consequently, these hypotheses emerge:
H ypothesis 1: Disconfirming evidence exposure will result in more instances o f
b elief perseverance than b elief change.
H ypothesis 2: Strong disconfirm ations will result in more conflict between
beliefs and evidence (and more cognitive dissonance) than weak disconfirm ations.
According to Festinger’s (1957) theory o f cognitive dissonance, a person who
senses conflicting thoughts will experience discom fort. Furtherm ore, research has shown
that m essages o f high involvement essentially have greater personal relevance and result
in greater consequences than messages o f low involvem ent (Petty and Cacioppo 1979;
Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann 1983). Thus, evidence containing salient inform ation on a
product will elicit a more personal connection for a person who is highly involved.
M oreover, a highly involved person is expected to engage in more active information
processing com pared to a person who is not as involved (Laurent and K apferer 1985).
Therefore, when people are involved with a particular product, they will likely experience
more intense feelings o f dissonance as a result o f their conflicting thoughts. People who
are less involved with a product are not expected to be as concerned.
H ypothesis
dissonance.

3:

B elief disconfirm ation

is positively

related

to

consum er
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H ypothesis 4: Product involvement moderates the relationship between belief
disconfirm ation and dissonance, such that the relationship will be stronger for
subjects with high product involvement than subjects with

low product

involvement.
People who experience dissonance due to b elief disconfirm ations are expected to
show less enthusiasm in their subsequent purchase-related behaviors. If disconfirm ing a
consum er’s subjective beliefs regarding a product o f interest generates sufficient
dissonance, then this dissonance will ultim ately affect the consum er’s intention to buy
that product in the future. Moreover, it is perhaps even less likely that the dissonant
consum er will be w illing to pay m ore for a prem ium product involved in the belief
disconfirm ation.
Research suggests that the intention to express w ord-of-m outh is related to
consum er perceptions o f value and quality (Hartline and Jones 1996). Consequently,
higher perceptions o f value and quality increase the likelihood o f expressing positive
word-of-m outh. Hartline and Jones (1996) found that o f the two correlates, value is more
influential. Certain attributes o f a product can be central to the overall perceived value o f
the product. People who have had their beliefs pertaining to these key attributes o f the
products they buy disconfirm ed are expected to engage less in positive word-of-m outh
com pared to people who have had their beliefs confirmed.
Hypothesis 5: Consum er dissonance is negatively related to perceived value.
Hypothesis 6: Perceived value is positively related to a) purchase intention and
b) word o f mouth.
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 (RQ1) will be tested via analysis o f variance (ANOVA). To
test Hypotheses 3 through 6 (RQ2), the model o f effects following evidence exposure
(seen in Figure 2.2) will be exam ined using structural equation modeling and hierarchical
multiple linear regression. A qualitative instrum ent will be em ployed to investigate RQ3.
Details regarding the research design overview and the m easurem ent instrum ents utilized
are discussed next in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

Research Design Overview
The research

assesses

whether robust,

disconfirm ing

evidence

influences

consum er beliefs regarding the perceived benefits o f organic food consumption. The
investigation attempts to induce a state o f dissonance via belief disconfirm ation and also
evaluates salient marketing outcomes including perceived value, purchase intention, and
word-of-mouth. The last phase o f the research consists o f a qualitative investigation
which attempts to discover possible reasons why consumers m ight persist in their
inaccurate beliefs despite being exposed to substantial disconfirm ing evidence.
The research em ploys a two (type o f evidence: confirm ing vs. disconfirm ing) x
two (evidence credibility: high vs. low) x two (num ber o f inform ational elements /
reasons: one vs. three) between subjects experimental design. A survey instrum ent is
created using established scales in marketing and psychology literature (see Appendix B
for all em ployed m easurem ent instruments). Data is collected from both current and
form er students at Louisiana Tech University.
The study utilizes a two-step analytical approach (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).
An overall m easurem ent model is developed to exam ine the reliability and the validity o f
the constructs o f interest using confirm atory factor analysis (CFA). Hypotheses 1 is
tested through the assessm ent o f qualitative responses.
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Hypothesis 2 is tested via ANOVA. Structural equations modeling is then be
employed to test the hypothesized model relationships (H3-H6) in AMOS 20. A test o f
moderation is conducted using hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis.
Next, a qualitative assessm ent will examine consum ers’ open-ended statements
containing explanations o f belief perseverance (as well as instances o f b elief change). It
is anticipated that the content analysis should help identify recurring themes about
consum er adam ancy and thus offer important insights. M oreover, a qualitative evaluation
will conceivably provide a basis for a future scale developm ent regarding the proclivity
to belief perseverance.
Studies that involve multiple measurements might increase the potential for
dem and characteristics. According to Saw yer (1975), using repeated m easures o f belief
or attitude change is especially prone to demand bias. To determine the biasing potential
o f such dem and bias, the subjects are asked for their opinion o f the study’s purpose at the
end o f the survey instrument.

Context o f Study and Pre-test C ontext
The research uses organic food as a study context. A report by Dem eritt (2002)
suggests that one main reason for American consumers not buying organic food is lack o f
knowledge and awareness. More specifically, almost 60% o f the respondents stated that
they have never considered buying organic products because they did not know about
them. Since the early 2000s, and with the continuously grow ing consum er interest and
popularity o f the organic food sector, this percentage o f American consum ers who have
never purchased organic foods has decreased substantially. To highlight one o f the key
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statistics reported by the Organic Trade Association (OTA) in 2014, it is estimated that
over 80% percent o f American families purchase organic food, at least sometimes.
The decision to choose organic food as a context for this study is not arbitrary. In
addition to the overw helm ingly optimistic organic food sector growth statistics cited
previously, researchers have suggested that a substantial degree o f ego-involvem ent with
a product m ay be necessary for disconfirm ation effects to be clearly indicated (Cohen and
G oldberg 1970; Anderson 1973). Generally speaking, “green” consumers or people who
buy “green” are thought to attach a great deal o f involvement to their purchases. W ith this
in mind, organic food is selected as popular class o f products that is conceived to be
relatively high in ego-involvem ent for many Americans.
After conducting in-depth interviews, Bauer, Heinrich and Schafer (2013)
ascertained that, for German consumers, the main reasons for buying organic food are
that it is 1) m ore nutritious than non-organic food, 2) kinder to the environm ent, and 3)
safer to consum e because no chem icals are used in the farming process. Interestingly
enough, the researchers also identified a fourth reason why German consumers buy
organic food. That is, German consumers also perceive organic food as being tastier than
non-organic food (Bauer, Heinrich and Schafer 2013). However, it is important to note
that these cited purchasing m otives fell within the first four ranks, but the order o f
precedence differed among the interviewed consumers.
This research conducts a sim ilar pre-test to C hang’s (2011) determ ination o f an
appropriate way to systemize the different levels o f strength for green advertising claim
in the context o f organic. That is, a pre-test is m andatory to determ ine the different levels
o f perceived im portance for the previously cited top three reasons why consumers buy
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organic:

safer,

kinder to

the

environment,

and

healthier.

Once

this

is

done,

confirm ing/disconfirm ing evidence is m anipulated effectively into appropriate levels o f
evidence strength depending on the order o f perceived im portance revealed by the pre
test.
Evidence exposure consists o f a two (type o f evidence: confirm ing vs.
disconfirm ing) x two (credibility: high vs. low) x two (num ber o f reasons: one vs. three)
between subjects experimental design. Thus, eight experimental groups result as shown
in Figure 3.1.

One
Three

High

Low

Confirming

Disconfirming

Type of Evidence

Figure 3.1 Experimental Groups

Subjects are exposed to substantial evidence which will either confirm or
disconfirm their beliefs regarding the perceived benefits o f organic food consumption.
Confirm ing evidence consists o f pro-organic inform ation, while disconfirm ing evidence
is expected to initiate dissonance for organic consumers. The strong-condition stimuli
contain facts from a highly credible source (i.e. Stanford U niversity) and include
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references to all three reasons why consumers buy organic food. On the other hand, the
w eak-condition stimuli contain remarks from a much less credible source (i.e. Delta
Com m unity College) and include only the least significant motive for buying organic
food. Hence, w eak confirm ing and disconfirm ing evidence are ascertained pending the
pre-test. The eight experimental stimuli or evidences are provided in Appendix A.
Three manipulation checks are in place to exam ine the viability o f the
experimental manipulations. Evidence believability is measured using 6-items employed
by Chang (2011) and original to Beltramini (1982) and M acKenzie and Lutz (1989). An
independent samples t-test facilitates the com parison o f mean believability ratings
between subjects in the high credibility and subjects in the low credibility experimental
groups. A higher mean rating from subjects in high credibility conditions com pared to
that o f subjects in the low credibility conditions signifies a successful credibility
manipulation.
For the second m anipulation check, subjects are asked to choose their prim ary
motive for buying organic food. In addition, subjects are asked to rate three items on a
seven-point Likert scale: the perceived level o f im portance attributed to nutrition, safety,
and environm ental friendliness in organic food consumption. A successful manipulation
o f evidence strength is indicated by obtaining mean responses that are com parable to
results o f the pre-test, and, at the very least, a similar rank order o f key motives. Lastly, a
third manipulation check asks participants w hether the random ly depicted evidence
contained pro-organic inform ation or, instead, challenged the notion o f organic
superiority over conventionally-produced foods.
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Hypothesis 1 is tested by assessing subjects’ reactions to the evidence. Subjects
are also asked if they are persuaded by the organic evidence presented in the survey. This
assessm ent also sets the stage for the ensuing qualitative assessment. Hypothesis 2 is
tested using ANOVA to assess o f the differences between subjects' mean dissonance
evaluations o f the strong and the weak disconfirm ing evidence.

M easurem ent Instrum ents
The first stage o f research (following necessary pre-testing) assesses consum ers’
subjective beliefs regarding organic food. Perceived health benefits, perceived safety
benefits, and perceived environm ental benefits o f organic food are m easured using scales
adapted from Bauer, Heinrich and Schafer (2013). Each o f these perceived organic
attribute scales contains four items measured along a 7-point, Likert-type scale. Thus,
subjective beliefs are m easured using 12 items total. Next, subjects are exposed to one o f
the eight forms o f organic food evidence.
The second stage o f the research investigates evidence exposure effects on
subjects’ dissonance. The level o f conflict between beliefs and the evidence provided is
measured with a 3-item scale developed by Gurhan-Canli and M aheswaran (1998). The
scale was originally used to measure the congruency (or lack o f congruency) between a
person’s brand beliefs and new information that he or she is exposed to. Thus, the
measurem ent instrum ent is easily adapted for use in the context o f organic food.
Elliott and Devine (1994) argued that any assessm ent o f dissonance should
include psychological discom fort since this is how the process o f dissonance arousal was
originally conceptualized by Festinger (1957). Hence, the discom fort scale is proposed to
be a reliable m easure o f cognitive dissonance (Elliot and Devine 1994). Subject’s
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potential discom fort due to any conflict between their subjective beliefs and the evidence
is measured using a 3-item scale developed by Elliot and Devine (1994). Discomfort
measures the extent to which subjects are experiencing a state o f psychological tension
and are troubled by it.
Product involvement is measured using a 5-item scale adapted from Beatty and
Talpade (1994) that measures the subjects’ level interest in some specified category o f
products. In this case, organic food will serve as the particular class o f products.
A second m easurem ent o f subjects’ perceived benefits o f organic food is taken to
determ ine if evidence exposure had any effect on their original beliefs. After seeing the
evidence, subjects are asked to use three sliding scales to indicate how their beliefs about
organic food have changed compared to their beliefs prior to exposure to the factual
information.
The effects o f induced dissonance (and consonance) on three outcom es are
exam ined following the second m easurem ent o f subjects’ perceived beliefs regarding
organic beliefs. Consum er perceived value is measured using a single dim ension from the
suggested 12-item short form o f the original 19 items from Sweeney and Soutar’s (2001)
PERVAL scale (W alsh, Shiu and Hassan 2014). The scale consists o f four value
dim ensions: quality, em otional, price, and social. Q uality or functional value refers to the
practical benefits o f using a product. Emotional or affective value refers to psychological
feelings that consumers derive from a product. Price value refers to product worth
com pared with the sacrifices made such as cost, time, or effort spent in obtaining the
product. Social value refers to the social utility derived from the product like self
enhancement, prestige, and status.
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O f these four value dim ensions proposed by Sweeny and Soutar (2001), quality or
functional value is the most harmonious and fitting given the context o f this study. In
general, consum ers do not buy organic food for its price nor for its em otional or social
purposes. Consum ers typically buy organic food for its perceived functional purposes,
such as the ones discussed previously (e.g. healthier, safer to consume, kinder to the
environm ent, etc.).
Purchase intention measures the inclination o f subjects to buy or at least try
organic food in the future. The m easurem ent instrum ent consists o f four items adapted
from Putrevu and Lord (1994). W ord-of-mouth measures subjects’ expressed likelihood
o f m aking positive comments about organic food. Positive w ord-of-m outh is assessed
using a four-item scale adapted from Briiggen, Foubert, and Grem ler (2011). Although
the original items pertain to restaurant word-of-m outh, they are easily adapted for use in
the study context o f organic foods. Finally, w illingness to pay a price prem ium measures
the am ount subjects are willing to pay for organic food over conventional food using a
four-item scale adapted from N etem eyer et al. (2004).

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND ANALYSES

Sam pling Procedure and Data Collection
Prior to the formal launch o f data collection, a pilot test was conducted to
ascertain a rank order o f key motives for buying organic food. This was done to
effectively manipulate the num ber o f reason conditions with one inform ational elem ent in
the evidence to contain the least popular one o f the three reasons. A short survey was
adm inistered to 79 undergraduate students in two junior level marketing courses at
Louisiana Tech University. As seen in Figure 4.1, a slight m ajority o f respondents (52%)
suggest that their main reason for buying organic food lies in a relative is healthiness
rationale. For the rem aining two reasons, respondents showed a very slight preference
toward the ‘safer to consum e’ aspect over ‘kinder to the environm ent.’

■ H e alth ier t h a n N o n -o rg an ic
■ S afer t o C o n s u m e
■ Kinder t o t h e E n v iro n m e n t
■ O th e r
■ N / A (I d o n o t bu y organic.)

Figure 4.1 Reasons fo r Buying Organic Food (Pre-test n = 79)
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Respondents who answered ‘O ther’ or ‘N /A ’ were given the option o f disclosing
additional information. Interestingly enough, one student declared that he or she believes
that organically grown food tastes better than conventionally grown food. For most o f the
30% non-buyers, the prim ary reason for not buying organic food is high pricing. This
finding did not come as a surprise since all o f the respondents were undergraduate
students who may have had limited financial resources.
The final study sample consists o f survey responses from undergraduate,
graduate, and form er students at Louisiana Tech University. Formal education is
conceived to be an influential factor in shaping peoples’ level o f know ledge and
familiarity with organic agriculture. Thus, college students (current and former) are
considered to be relevant to this particular study setting which revolves around the
organic food industry. A total o f 392 observations are recorded. The estim ated survey
com pletion time is 10 to 15 minutes. For this reason, fifteen (15) speeder cases were
dropped for being com pleted in less than four minutes as well as for 50 % or more
missing data. An additional 36 cases were eliminated for failing to correctly respond to
all three attention filters included in the survey. Consequently, a final total o f 341
responses were analyzed.
The mean age o f the subjects was 26. Nearly 62% o f the subjects w ere in the age
range o f 18 to 25, and about 26% o f the subjects fell into the 26 to 35 range. The male to
female ratio o f the subjects was almost evenly split (49.6% male to 50.4% female).
Roughly 60% o f the subjects were Caucasian, 19% were African American, 13% were
Asian, and 3% were Hispanic / Latino. The rem aining 5% o f subjects listed themselves as
‘O ther.’
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Subjects were random ly assigned to one o f the eight experimental conditions [two
(evidence type: confirm ing vs. disconfirm ing) x two (credibility: high vs. low) x two
(num ber o f reasons: one vs. three)]. Based on the pre-test study results, the four w eaker
evidence cells that only contain one argument were com posed using environmental
friendliness as the least important o f the three reasons for buying organic food (see
A ppendix A for Experimental Stimuli).

Confirm atory Factor Analysis
Latent measurem ent structure o f all relevant constructs was tested using
confirm atory factor analysis (CFA) in AMOS 20 (Anderson and G erbing 1988). The
overall CFA was conducted on the six m ulti-item constructs: b elief disconfirm ation,
consum er dissonance, product involvement, perceived value, purchase intention, and
word o f mouth, all measured as described in Chapter Three and as illustrated in Appendix
B. The initial CFA m easurem ent model contained 22 measured items with a resulting chisquare fit statistic o f 555.0 (p-value < 0.001) and 194 degrees o f freedom. The model
com parative fit index (CFI) was 0.957, the root mean squared error o f approxim ation
(RM SEA) was 0.074, and the parsim ony normed fit index (PNF1) was 0.786.
According to H air et al. (2010), RM SEA values less than 0.07 with a CFI o f 0.92
or higher given the overall CFA sample size (N > 250) and num ber o f variables (12 < m
< 30) dem onstrate goodness-of-fit. The initial overall m easurem ent m odel, therefore,
exhibited slightly less than adequate goodness-of-fit given the resulting RM SEA o f
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0.074. Consequently, a more com prehensive inspection o f standardized loading estimates
and standardized covariance residuals was necessary to identify possible problem atic
issues in the m easurem ent model.
Variables that have low loadings and high standardized residuals were eliminated
from the initial overall CFA model. One reverse-coded variable m easuring product
involvem ent was dropped from the m easurem ent model for having a low factor loading
(>. = 0.25). Three additional variables were removed from the model for exhibiting high
standardized covariance residuals (greater than 2.5). Each o f these suspect variables
m easured three separate constructs: product involvement, purchase intention, and positive
w ord-of-m outh. The three variables correlated heavily with one another (described in
more detail in the section on construct validity). Thus, a total o f four items were purged
from the original model (18% reduction) resulting in a final overall CFA m easurem ent
model com prised o f 18 variables.
The final overall CFA m easurem ent model dem onstrated a notable im provem ent
in goodness-of-fit com pared to the initial CFA model fit. The final overall model
produced a chi-square fit statistic x2 = 231.7 (p-value < 0.001) with 120 degrees o f
freedom. The model CFI was 0.983, the RM SEA was 0.052, and the PNFI was 0.757.
Hence, the final overall measurement model exhibited sound goodness-of-fit (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1
Confirm atory Factor Analysis and Comparison o f Fit fo r M easurement M odels
Overall M easurem ent Model
Initial Model

x2

df

p

CFI

RM SEA

PNFI

555.0

194

0.000

0.957

0.074

0.786

231.7

120

0.000

0.983

0.052

0.757

B elief Disconfirmation
(3 items)
Consum er Dissonance
(3 items)
Product Involvem ent
(5 items)
Perceived Value
(3 items)
Purchase Intention
(4 items)
Positive W ord-of-M outh
(4 items)

Final Model
B elief Disconfirmation 1
(3 items)
Consum er Dissonance 1
(3 items)
Product Involvem ent2
(3 items)
Perceived Value 1
(3 items)
Purchase Intention 3
(3 items)
Positive W ord-of-M outh 3
(3 items)

N otes:
1 Construct items remain intact
2 Two items removed due to low factor loading and high standardized residual
covariances
3 One item removed following residual analysis____________________________________
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C onstruct Validity
G oodness-of-fit alone does not substantiate an effective m easurem ent theory.
Construct validity refers to the extent to which a set o f m easured variables actually
reflects the theoretical latent construct that the variables are intended to measure (H air et
al. 2010). Therefore, the overall CFA m easurem ent model must display adequate fit and
must also show evidence o f construct validity.
Construct validity is com prised o f four fundamental com ponents: convergent
validity, discrim inant validity, nomological validity, and face validity (H air et al. 2010).
Convergent validity implies that the variable indicators o f a particular construct should
share a high proportion o f variance in common. Hence, average variance extracted o f
each latent construct was calculated to assess convergence. Adequate convergence is
supported by obtaining an average variance extracted o f 0.5 or higher (H air et al. 2010).
All o f the six constructs included in the overall m easurement model had satisfactory
extracted variances ranging from 0.74 to 0.90. Therefore, the variable indicators
dem onstrated sufficient convergence which in turn provided support for an accurate
measurem ent theory.
Discrim inant validity is the extent to which the constructs are truly distinct from
one another (H air et al. 2010). A rigorous test o f discrim inant validity entails com paring
the average variance extracted for any two constructs with the squared correlation
estimate between the two constructs. Good evidence o f discrim inant validity is shown by
obtaining extracted variances that are higher than the squared correlation estimates (Hair
et al. 2010). V ariance extracted for each o f the six constructs in the overall measurem ent
model was higher than any o f the squared correlation estimates between constructs. Thus,
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each o f the six measured constructs was considered unique since the constructs show
signs o f sound discrim inant validity.
Nomological validity exam ines whether the correlations between constructs make
sense according to the measurement theory (H air et al. 2010). The construct correlations
matrix (O) in Table 4.2 revealed that the valences o f all significant correlations were
logical and consistent with the underlying theory. Consequently, these results provided
evidence for nom ological validity.

Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics and Construct Correlations ( 0 Matrix)
Mean
SD
Construct
BD
CD
INV
3.33
1.53
1. Belief Disconfirmation
(0.89)
2.52
1.56
2. Consumer Dissonance
0.297* (0.93)
3.63
1.67
3. Product Involvement
-0.013 -0.111
(0.96)
4.82
1.22
4. Perceived Value
-0.006 -0.227* 0.753*
1.64
4.18
5. Purchase Intention
0.012
-0.208* 0.815*
6. Positive Word-of4.57
1.56
Mouth
0.028
-0.211* 0.753*
Notes: Construct reliability coefficients (a) for multi-item scales in
main diagonal. N = 341
* p < 0.001

PV

INT

WOM

(0.91)
0.649* (0.95)
0.762* 0.833* (0.96)
parentheses along the

Face validity is the extent to which the content o f variables is consistent with the
definition o f the m easured construct and should be established prior to com m encing tests
o f m easurem ent theory (Hair et al. 2010). This being said, one o f the four purchase
intention scale items adapted from Putrevu and Lord (1994) was spotted to be more in
accord with positive word-of-m outh during the overall CFA model assessment: ‘Suppose
that a friend called you to get your advice in his/her grocery shopping trip. W ould you
recom m end him /her to buy organic?’ Coincidentally, this item was one o f the three that
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was dropped from the initial overall CFA model following an analysis o f standardized
covariance residuals. All variables in the final overall CFA model exhibited good face
validity (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3
Standardized Factor Loadings

BD1
BD2
BD3
CD1
CD2
CD3
INV2
INV3
INV5
PV1
PV2
PV3
INTI
INT2
INT3
WOM1
W OM 2
WOM3
Variance
Extracted
Construct
Reliability

BD
0.85
0.88
0.85

CD

INV

PV

IN T

WOM

0.88
0.95
0.88
0.96
0.97
0.91
0.85
0.93
0.85
0.95
0.92
0.92
0.95
0.93
0.94
0.74
0.89

0.82
0.93

0.90
0.96

0.77
0.91

0.86
0.95

0.89
0.96

M anipulation Checks
M anipulation checks were used for the type o f evidence (confirm ing vs.
discontinuing), the evidence credibility (high vs. low), and the num ber o f arguments (one
vs. three) experimental variables. Two separate items asked subjects to recall a) w hether
the evidence shown suggested that organic food is better than conventionally grown
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(non-organic) food, and b) which research entity reported the factual evidence on organic
food. Confirm ing conditions contained evidence suggesting organic food superiority,
while discontinuing conditions consisted o f evidence suggesting no added benefits to
organic food consumption. M oreover, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Stanford University
was cited as the source o f evidence in high credibility conditions as opposed to Delta
Com m unity College in the low credibility conditions. Results shown in Table 4.4 support
the notion that the majority subjects successfully recalled the depicted evidence.

Table 4.4
M anipulation Recall
N

Incorrect

Correct

% Correct

Confirm ing

188

38

150

79.8

Disconfirming

153

45

108

70.6

High Credibility

173

13

160

92.5

Low Credibility

168

32

136

81.0

Evidence Type

Evidence believability was measured using six-items on seven-point Likert scale
that asked subjects how much they agree or disagree with evaluative term s regarding the
content o f the evidence such as ‘credible’, ‘believable’, and trustw orthy.’ This scale
assessm ent was not included in the CFA since it was not part o f the model theorized. A
com posite reliability analysis conducted on the six scale items m easuring evidence
believability produced a C ronbach’s coefficient alpha (a) o f 0.92. Thus, the evidence
believability scale was considered to have very good reliability (Zikm und and Babin
2 0 1 0 ).
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An independent samples t-test was used to assess the mean differences in
perceived evidence believability between subjects in the high and low credibility groups
(Table 4.5). The difference in means yielded an insignificant Levene’s test for equality o f
variances (F = 0.005, p = 0.942). Subjects in the high credibility groups revealed a mean
believability rating o f 5.2 com pared to a mean rating o f 4.9 by subjects in the low
credibility groups (t = -2.61, d f = 339, p = 0.01). Thus, statistically speaking, the results
were consistent with an effective m anipulation o f evidence credibility. Practically
speaking, however, the effect size was small for the m anipulation given that each o f the
obtained means rounded to 5. Perhaps the reason for this finding is that the evidence itself
was not very surprising for most subjects. Consequently, the source o f evidence m ay not
have really mattered.

Table 4.5
M eans and Standard Deviations o f Evidence Believability
N

Mean

SD

SE

High

173

5.20

1.04

0.08

Low

168

4.90

1.08

0.08

Credibility

A subsequent investigation o f the key m otives for buying organic food was
conducted to substantiate the rank order obtained from the pilot study. Bauer, Heinrich
and Schafer’s (2013) 12-item scale was employed for assessing beliefs regarding
perceived organic benefits (a = 0.93). As depicted in Table 4.6, health benefits had the
highest mean rating (5.13) followed by environm ental (4.95) and safety benefits (4.79).
These results conflicted slightly with the rank order obtained in the pilot study.
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Therefore, further inspection was warranted. (Note: Females reported slightly higher
means com pared to males for each o f the three perceived benefits.)

Table 4.6
Mean Ratings for Perceived Organic Benefits
Motives

Overall Mean (SD)

M ales

Females

Health

5.14(1.24)

5 .0 7 (1 .2 3 )

5.20(1.25)

Safety

4 .79(1.34)

4 .7 2 (1 .3 1 )

4.8 6 (1 .38)

Environmental

4.95 (1.25)

4 .8 0 (1 .2 6 )

5.10(1.23)

The same query from the pilot study which asked respondents to select their
prim ary reason for buying organic food was also adm inistered to the final study sample.
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, a sizable 43% o f the subjects listed ‘healthier’ as their
num ber one reason for buying organic food. Furthermore, a much higher percentage o f
subjects chose ‘safer to consum e’ as a principle m otive (17% ) com pared to the
percentage o f subjects who selected ‘kinder to the environm ent’ (5%). Thus, the notion
that eco-friendliness is the least important o f the three main cited reasons for buying
organic food was reasonably supported, and the factual evidence conditions containing
this category only conceivably provided the w eakest arguments.
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■ H e a lth ie r th a n N o n-org an ic
■ S afer t o C o n s u m e
■ Kinder t o t h e E n v iro n m e n t
■ O th e r
■ N / A (I d o n o t buy organic.)

Figure 4.2 Reasons fo r Buying Organic Food (Final Sample N = 341)

H ypothesis 1
Prior to testing the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that disconfirm ing evidence
exposure results in more cases o f belief perseverance than belief change, the 45 subjects
who did not correctly recall that the disconfirm ing organic evidence proclaims that
organic food is not better than non-organic food were rem oved from the subsequent
analysis. Furthermore, based on the obtained qualitative responses, an additional 35
subjects were elim inated for having preconceived negative views o f organic food and / or
the organic industry. That is, these subjects viewed the disconfirm ing evidence regarding
organic food as ‘confirm ing’ their existing beliefs. For example, one o f the subjects
expressed: “I never really thought organic farming was much better for you or for the
environm ent and these facts confirm that.” A nother one o f these skeptical subjects in
doubt states that “organic food is overrated and misleads the public to believe it is
healthier.”
Consequently, o f the 153 total subjects in the disconfirm ing evidence groups, only
73 subjects provided suitable data for assessing Hypothesis 1. Subjects were asked if they
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were persuaded by the disconfirm ing organic evidence presented in the survey. Forty
subjects yielded to the factual evidence provided and changed their beliefs, while the
remaining 33 subjects retained their existing pro-organic beliefs and succumbed to belief
perseverance. Thus, the prediction offered in Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Nevertheless,
the qualitative responses o f these 33 subjects provided a solid sample for evaluating the
premise o f b elief perseverance.
This initial assessm ent indicated that some subjects had their beliefs confirm ed
with ‘disconfirm ing’ evidence types, while others had their beliefs disconfirm ed with
‘confirm ing’ pro-organic evidence. Thus, from this point on for the sake o f clarification
due to this finding, ‘disconfirm ing’ evidence will be referred to as ‘factual’ or ‘researchbased’ evidence, and ‘confirm ing’ evidence will be referred to as ‘m yth’ or ‘fictitious’
evidence. The ANOVA and SEM models analyses included the entire sam ple size since
dissonant feelings m ay arise for either evidence type. The experim ental results are
discussed first, followed by the SEM results and qualitative assessment.

Experim ental Results
Table 4.7 displays descriptive statistics. A multivariate analysis o f variance
(M ANOVA) assessm ent using all respondents was necessary prior to testing the
relationships predicted in Hypothesis 2. This model used all experimental variables to
predict each com posite dependent variable (belief disconfirm ation, consum er dissonance,
perceived value, purchase intention, and positive word o f mouth) within a full-factorial
design. The results suggested significant m ultivariate F (based on W ilks’ Lambda)
statistics for Evidence Type [F(5, 329) = 5.23, p < 0.001] and the Credibility x Number
o f Reasons interaction [F(5, 329) = 2.34, p < 0.05], The results also suggested slightly
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significant results (at the 0.10 level) for the N um ber o f Reasons variable [F(5, 329) =
1.98, p = 0.08] as well as for the Evidence Type x N um ber o f Reasons interaction [F(5,
329) - 2.14, p = 0.06]. Insignificant multivariate F statistics were found for Credibility
[F(5, 329) = 1.13, p = 0.34], the Evidence Type x Credibility interaction [F(5, 329) =
0.91, p = 0.47], and the three-way interaction [F(5, 329) = 0.19, p = 0.97]. The ensuing
results are a reflection o f the univariate, full-factorial ANOVA model analyses which
include all main effects and interactions as predictors.

Table 4.7
Means and Standard Deviations
Belief
Disconfirmation

Consumer
Dissonance

Perceived
Value

Purchase
Intention

Positive
WOM

Myth

3.19(1.45)

2 .2 0 (1 .4 6 )

4.9 7 (1 .2 2 )

4 .4 8 (1 .5 9 )

4.8 4 (1 .5 0 )

Factual

3.50(1.61)

2.90(1.6 1)

4.6 4 (1 .2 1 )

3.82 (1.62)

4.25 (1.58)

Low

3.46(1.58)

2.6 2 (1 .6 0 )

4.7 4 (1 .2 6 )

4.04 (1.64)

4.4 9 (1 .6 1 )

High

3.20(1.48)

2.41 (1.52)

4.9 0 (1 .1 9 )

4.32 (1.62)

4.65 (1.52)

One

3.40(1.56)

2.38 (1.47)

4.83 (1.25)

4 .0 6 (1 .5 7 )

4.5 7 (1 .5 9 )

Three

3.26(1.51)

2 .64(1.64)

4.81 (1.20)

4 .2 9 (1 .6 9 )

4.5 7 (1 .5 4 )

Overall Mean

3.33 (1.53)

2.52 (1.56)

4.82 (1.23)

4 .1 8 (1 .6 4 )

4.5 7 (1 .5 6 )

Independent variables
Evidence Tvpe

C redibility

Number o f Reasons

Two separate full-factorial ANOVA models were used to test the predicted
relationships in Hypothesis 2 between evidence strength and the dependent variables o f
interest, b elief disconfirm ation and consum er dissonance. The first predicted belief
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disconfirm ation (incongruence between beliefs and information), and the second
predicted consum er dissonance (psychological discomfort). The first univariate model F
statistic was insignificant [F(7, 340) = 1.47, p = 0.18]. The second model F statistic was
significant [F (7, 340) = 3.22, p < 0.01)]. As a result, further analysis focused on
exam ining the main effects on consum er dissonance.
A significant evidence type main effect on consum er dissonance was found (F =
16.58, p < 0.001). Subjects reacted to factual evidence with a mean dissonance rating o f
2.90 com pared to 2.20 for fictitious evidence. These results were consistent with the
general hypothesis that the factual, researched-based evidence leads to more feelings o f
dissonance than the mythical, pro-organic evidence. However, the results revealed
insignificant main effects o f credibility and num ber o f reasons on consum er dissonance
(F = 0.73, p = 0.40 and F = 2.20, p = 0.14, respectively). In addition, the Credibility x
Num ber o f Reasons interaction effect on dissonance was insignificant (F = 1.33,
p = 0.25). The other pair o f tw o-w ay interactions and the three-way interaction were also
found to be insignificant. Thus, the predictions in Hypothesis 2 w ere not supported since
neither o f the two strength factors (credibility nor the num ber o f reasons) had an effect on
cognitive dissonance (Figure 4.3).
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4
B.5
2.83
2.50
2.44

2.39

1.5

1
Low Credibility
One Reason

High Credibility
Three Reasons

Figure 4.3 Strength Interaction Effect (Lack of) on Consumer Dissonance

The estim ated marginal means are reported. Subjects reacted to low credibility
evidence with a mean dissonance rating o f 2.61 com pared to 2.47 for high credibility
evidence. M oreover, subjects revealed a mean dissonance rating o f 2.42 for evidence
containing one o f the reasons for buying organic food com pared to 2.66 for subjects
exposed to evidence with all three reasons. These results, if significant, would only
partially support Hypothesis 2 since strong evidence is defined as having high credibility
and containing three motivational reasons.

Structural M odel Testing
The structural m odeling approach em ployed followed the tw o-step analytical
procedure (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Although, in this case, a second m easurem ent
model was developed to exam ine only the constructs o f interest necessary for structural
equation modeling. That is, product involvement was left out o f the subsequent CFA
model given that the test o f moderation is conducted via hierarchical multiple linear
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regression. Structural equation m odeling (SEM ) was employed to test the rem aining
hypothesized theoretical model relationships shown in Figure 2.2.
The second CFA model was run on the five multi-item constructs once product
involvement was removed from the overall m easurement model (Table 4.8). The
x = 163.6, p < 0.001,

resulting m easurem ent model displayed satisfactory fit statistics:
d f = 80, CFI = 0.983, RM SEA = 0.055, and PNFI = 0.737.

Table 4.8
Structural Path Coefficients fo r Theoretical Model

Hypotheses/paths
H3:
BD —►CD

P

H5:
C D —> PV
H6a:
PV —►INT
H6b:
PV -► WOM
Added Path:
INT -► W OM
Endogenous
Constructs
CD
PV
W OM
INT
M odel Fit
X2
313.1

Theoretical Model
t

P

0.295

5.053

***

-0.238

-4.139

***

0.719

13.816

***

0.813

16.667

***

n/a

n/a

n/a

R2
0.087
0.057
0.662
0.517
df
86

RM SEA
0.088

CFI
0.954

PNFI
0.769

The resulting chi-square fit statistic from testing the structural model is 313.1
(p < 0.001) with 86 degrees o f freedom. The model CFI was 0.954, the RM SEA was
0.088, and the PNFI was 0.769. The obtained RM SEA was above the recom m ended cut
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o ff rule o f thum b o f 0.07. Furthermore, the chi-square difference between the
m easurem ent model and structural model was significant (Ax2 - 149.5, Adf = 6), which
suggested inadequate structural fit to the specified theory (H air et al. 2010). A more
detailed explanation for why this occurred is included in post hoc analyses along with a
revised theoretical model.
Despite the lacking fit, model hypotheses were tested by exam ining standardized
path estimates. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, a positive relationship existed between
belief disconfirm ation and consum er dissonance (P = 0.295, t = 5.053, p < 0.001). In
support o f Hypothesis 5, structural model results depicted a negative relationship between
consum er dissonance and perceived value (P = -0.238, t = -4.139, p < 0.001). As
predicted by Hypothesis 6a and 6b, a positive relationship existed between perceived
value and purchase intention (P = 0.719, t = 13.816, p < 0.001), as well as between
perceived value and positive word o f mouth (P = 0.813, t = 16.667, p < 0.001).

M oderation Test
A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test the
hypothesis w hether product involvement moderates the relationship between belief
disconfirm ation

and consum er dissonance.

In the first regression model, belief

disconfirm ation and product involvement, the two ‘independent variables,’ were included
to predict consum er dissonance, the ‘dependent variable.’ B elief disconfirm ation and
product involvem ent accounted for a significant amount o f variance in consum er
dissonance: R2 = 0.093, F (2, 338) = 17.33, and p < 0.001 (Figure 4.4).
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In the second regression model, the interaction between b elief disconfirm ation
and product involvem ent was added to the analysis. This interaction term failed to
account for a significant proportion o f the variance in consum er dissonance: AR2 = .004,
AF (1, 337) = 1.52, and p = 0.219. Thus, the m oderating effect o f product involvem ent on
the relationship between belief disconfirm ation and consum er dissonance predicted by
Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Qualitative Assessm ent
Ryan and Bernard (2003) provide an excellent guide for analyzing text responses.
The researchers suggest that analyzing text involves four tasks: 1) discovering themes
and subthemes, 2) winnow ing themes to a manageable few by keeping the ones that are
more pertinent, 3) building hierarchies o f themes, and 4) linking themes into theoretical
models. The prim ary goal o f the qualitative portion o f this dissertation was to discover
themes o f belief perseverance, and Ryan and Bernard (2003) offer several techniques for
conducting this main task (e.g. repetitions, metaphors and analogies, transitions, missing
data etc.).
The researchers’ decision tree seen in Figure 4.5 was utilized, and the repetitions
technique was selected to facilitate the unearthing o f recurring themes. Repetition is cited
as one o f the simplest techniques to identify themes. Occurring and reoccurring concepts
w ere noted and connected to the subjects’ verbatim expressions. Given the m anageable
sample o f belief preserving subjects, this operation was perform ed m anually w ithout the
use o f text analysis software. Concepts that appeared frequently in the qualitative
responses were presum ably more likely to be themes o f a particular a phenom enon (Ryan
and Bernard 2003). In this case, that phenom enon is belief perseverance.

Figure 4.5 Ryan and Bernard 's (2003) Decision Tree

Selecting among Theme-ldentification Techniques
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Potential themes for belief perseverance were explored by assessing qualitative
responses o f the 33 subjects discussed during the testing o f Hypothesis 1. Below is a
succinct selection o f subjects’ responses containing explanations for b elief perseverance
(explicit and implicit):
1.

I w ill not be tricked or lied to about fo o d s m y fa m ily consumes. Public
information this day in age needs to be questioned, a n d I do not believe
everything I am told.

2.

I don't know the scope o f the research and the limitations o f it methodologies. I
clearly see the difference when I consume, it's not psychological, it's real.

3.

I do not fin d the evidence presented in this survey the least bit compelling. I f
anyone is convinced by a couple o f paragraphs, they probably change their minds
quite often.

4.

There is ju s t as much research to the contrary. A ten to twenty year, in depth,
non-partisan study o f a wide sam pling o f people who d id and d id not consume
organic fo o d s w ould change m y stance one way or another.

5.

Even i f it is not healthier and has no better impact on the environment, from
experience I know that organic dairy products last longer; therefore, I will
continue buying organic dairy because it allows me to waste less which in turn is
more cost effective and produces less waste (better fo r the environment).

6.

I think I am not convinced because it goes against everything that I thought I
knew. I think time and more research w ould change m y stance.

7.

I believe including some current statistics and fig u res (from a fe w creditable
sources) about the overall yields o f crops using both traditional and organic
grow ing methods, might be a good way to com pel more people to consider the
points being made in the presented information. Nothing speaks stronger than
stats from a 'well-known and established so u rc e.'

8.

Links to research papers with fa c tu a l evidence w ould help me believe more as I
am naturally skeptic o f things. I prefer prim ary research and fa c ts instead o f
sum m arized secondary sources.

9.

I still think that ultim ately organic fo o d is safer and better fo r the environment
because it does not require extensive fa c to ry processing or chem ical inductions
that processed fo o d s undergo. Factory fu n ctio n in itse lf is harm ful to the
environm ent due to the use o f natural resources to m aintain fu n ctio n and release
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o f harsh chemicals into the atmosphere.

Organic foods are subject to

contamination but not to the magnitude that processed foods are.
10.

I view this type o f research with skepticism. I w ould need answers: Who funded
the research? What was the extent o f the research? What type o f sampling? What
was the time p erio d and length o f the research? I strongly believe that less
chem icals/pesticides used in the production o f fo o d s is healthier.

Five recurring themes em erged following a careful exam ination o f the full sample
o f text responses. The themes were categorized by the type o f reasoning revealed
(explicit and implicit) for why the subjects did not modify their beliefs. These five types
were classified as Discrediters, Debaters, Skeptics, Upholders, and Fencers. Discrediters
dow nplayed the significance o f inform ation shown to them and did this in a num ber o f
ways. For instance, several subjects stated that the evidence study was incom prehensive
and not thorough or detailed enough. Some questioned the scope o f the research and its
m ethods and limitations, while others suggested that more testing was needed to validate
the evidence (even though the evidence given was obtained from a m eta-analysis o f
hundreds o f studies).
Debaters argued the notion o f opposing research. That is, a num ber o f subjects
cited the fact that pro-organic inform ation also exists (e.g. “There is ju st as much research
to the contrary).” Skeptics had their doubts and suspicion or distrust o f any shared
inform ation in general. A prim e exam ple is seen in the first text response, e.g. “ I do not
believe everything I ’m told.” Upholders were keen to make mention o f additional
perceived attributes that were not already debunked. For exam ple, some subjects claimed
that organic food lasts longer or tastes better. Others rem arked on the perceived long term
benefits and safeguards o f organic food consum ption and offered in depth rationale for
their viewpoints (as seen in the fifth response listed). Lastly, Fencers alluded to the
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concept o f tim e in their explanations and were essentially slow adopters. These people
were on the cusp o f belief m odification ( ‘on the fence’) yet hesitant o f such a sudden
change o f thought.
The five themes o f b elief perseverance discussed are not purported to be allinclusive. M oreover, a person characterized by b elief perseverance may exhibit aspects
from more than one category, as is the case in this particular study. For instance, as seen
in the sixth text response, this subject displayed characteristics o f being a Discrediter
(calling for “more research”) and being a Fencer (“more time ... w ould change my
stance”). Likewise, the pair o f subjects who reported responses eight and 10 both showed
signs o f being Discrediters (e.g. “ I prefer prim ary research and facts instead o f
sum m arized secondary sources”) and Skeptics (e.g. “ I am naturally skeptic o f things,”
and “ I view this type o f research with skepticism .”) The im plications o f these qualitative
findings (and all findings in this chapter) are discussed in Chapter Five.

Post Hoc Analyses
Post hoc analyses were conducted to investigate 1) the inadequate fit obtained for
the hypothesized theoretical model, and 2) the main (and interaction) effects on the
m arketing-related outcomes, i.e. perceived value, purchase intention, and positive word
o f mouth.
Firstly, exam ination o f the standardized covariance residuals in the hypothesized
structural model revealed very high values (greater than 4) surrounding variables for
purchase intention and positive word o f mouth. This finding suggested high collinearity
between the two constructs. As seen in Table 4.2, purchase intention and positive word o f
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mouth had a shared covariance o f O = 0.833 (p < 0.001). Naturally, these two outcomes
are highly correlated, and both sets o f variables could have perhaps loaded onto one
com posite, unidim ensional construct.
The decision was made to remove a constraint by estimating a path from purchase
intention to positive word-of-mouth. The reasoning was that consum ers are not likely to
engage in positive word-of-m outh until and unless they are w illing to purchase a product
themselves. A new, revised theoretical model was tested once this solo change o f an
added path estimate is implemented.
The revised theoretical model dem onstrated significantly im proved fit statistics:
X2 = 168.1, p < 0.001, d f = 85, CFI = 0.983, RM SEA = 0.054, and PNFI = 0.783.
A ccordingly, the chi-square difference between the m easurem ent model and the revised
structural model was insignificant (Ax2 = 4.5, A df = 5), which provided substantial
supporting evidence for the revised theoretical model (Hair et al. 2010). Consequently,
the standardized path estimates in the revised structural model were exam ined to ensure
that all o f the hypothesized relationships were still supported.
In validation o f Hypothesis 3, a positive relationship existed between belief
disconfirm ation and consum er dissonance (P = 0.295, t = 5.055, p < 0.001). Consistent
w ith Hypothesis 5, revised model results depicted a negative relationship between
consum er dissonance and perceived value (P = -0.232, t = -4.024, p < 0.001). In accord
with Hypothesis 6a and 6b, a positive relationship was exhibited between perceived value
and purchase intention (P = 0.651, t = 12.618, p < 0.001), as well as between perceived
value and positive w ord o f mouth (P = 0.384, t = 8.544, p < 0.001). Table 4.9 outlines the
revised model.
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Table 4.9
Structural Path Coefficients fo r Revised Model
Revised Model
Hypotheses/paths
H3:
BD —*• CD
H5:
CD —* PV
H6a:
PV —* INT
H6b:
PV -► W OM
Added Path:
INT -+ W OM
Endogenous
Constructs
CD
PV
W OM
INT
M odel Fit

P

t

P

0.295

5.055

***

-0.232

-4.024

***

0.651

12.618

"kick

0.384

8.544

k k k

0.582

13.269

k k k

R2
0.087
0.054
0.423
0.777
df
85

X2
168.1

RM SEA
0.054

CFI
0.983

PNFI
0.783

Not surprisingly, the removed constraint which estimated a structural path from
purchase intention to positive word o f mouth also revealed a significant, positive
relationship (P = 0.582, t = 13.269, p < 0.001).
Regarding the second portion o f the post hoc analyses, Table 4.10 displays
ANOVA results showing the effects o f the experimental predictors on three dependent
variable outcomes: perceived value, purchase intention, and positive w ord o f mouth.
Although these relationships were not hypothesized, the results w arranted further
appraisal.
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Three separate full-factorial ANOVA models were used to test the relationships
between the predictors and the three marketing outcomes. All three univariate F statistics
were significant for the models predicting perceived value [F(7, 340) = 2.17, p < 0.05],
purchase intention [F(7, 340) = 3.59, p = 0.001], and positive word o f m outh [F(7, 340) =
4.61, p < 0.001],
As portrayed in Table 4.10, significant evidence type main effects on all three
outcom e variables were found. Subjects exposed to factual evidence revealed a mean
perceived value rating o f 4.64 compared to 4.97 for those shown pro-organic, mythical
evidence. The same phenom enon o f higher mean outcome ratings resulting from proorganic inform ation exposure was observed for purchase intention (Xmy[fl - 4.48 vs.
xfactual = 3 82> and P °sitive WOrd o f m0Uth ( Xmyth = 4 84 VS‘ Xfactual = 4-25).
A m arginally significant tw o-w ay interaction o f Evidence Type x N um ber o f
Reasons was found to influence perceived value (F = 3.28, p = 0.07), while this same
interaction significantly affected positive word o f m outh (F = 6.96, p = 0.01). These
interactions are displayed in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Although all subjects reported sim ilar
mean perceived values for evidence containing one motivational reason for buying
organic food (X myth_one = 4.86, Xfactual- one = 4.80), subjects shown three motivational
reasons indicated higher perceived value in mythical, pro-organic conditions com pared to
those in factual evidence conditions {Xmyth_three = 5.08, Xfactual_three = 4.54).
M oreover, sim ilar means for positive w ord o f m outh were reported across one-reason
conditions
conditions

(xmyth-one

= 4.63, Xfactual_one = 4.53), but not in the three-reason

(xmyth_three = 5.04, Xfactual^ three

= 4.07).
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Figure 4.7 Evidence Type x Num ber o f Reasons on Perceived Value

The Credibility x N um ber o f Reasons interaction significantly affected positive
w ord o f m outh (F = 6.69, p = 0.01) and, to a lesser extent, purchase intention at the 0.10
level (F = 3.28, p = 0.07). These interaction effects on purchase intention and positive
word o f m outh are depicted in Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10, respectively. All subjects
reported sim ilar buying intentions for evidence containing one motivational reason for
buying organic food, regardless o f credibility (y Jotv_one = 4.08, X high_one = 4.01).
However, subjects shown three m otivational reasons indicated higher intentions to buy in
high credibility conditions com pared to those in low credibility conditions ( X [o w- t h r e e =
3-98, X h ig h ~ t h r e e = 4.55). Furthermore, slight mean differences for positive word o f
mouth were noted across one-reason conditions ( y lo
. w —one = 4.74, y. •n i.g h —one= 4.42),n
’

^

whereas larger mean differences were obtained from three-reason conditions (X low^ three
h ig h -th r e e
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Figure 4.10 Credibility x Number o f Reasons on Positive W OM

Given the statistically significant yet small effect size resulting from the
credibility m anipulation, i.e. mean ratings o f 5.2 and 4.9 for the high and low credibility
conditions, respectively, a more thorough investigation o f this effect was warranted. A
full-factorial multivariate model was run using evidence believability as a covariate. The
resulting M ANCOVA model was not significant [F(8, 340) = 1.54, p = 0.14).
Consequently, the covariate was removed to check the significance o f the M ANOVA
model. Results from the M ANOVA model, however, were still insignificant [F(7, 340) =
1.47, p = 0.18]. Thus, for all practical purposes, the credibility m anipulation was not very
substantial and adequate at best.
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Sum m ary o f Findings
The following is a brief synopsis o f key findings from the overall results and
analyses:

Finding 1: No support was found for Hypothesis 1 which predicts that factual
evidence exposure will result in more instances o f b elief perseverance than
belief change. The subjects who m odified their beliefs outnum bered those
who persisted with their existing beliefs.
Finding 2: A significant evidence type main effect on consum er dissonance was
found, wherein subjects exhibit higher mean dissonance ratings for factual
evidence compared to mythical, pro-organic evidence.
Finding 3: The prediction offered in Hypothesis 2 was not supported since the
main effects o f credibility and num ber o f reasons (and interaction effect)
on consum er dissonance were insignificant.
Finding 4: Significant evidence type main effects on perceived value, purchase
intention, and word o f m outh were found.
Finding 5: Statistical support was found for a tw o-w ay interaction o f Evidence
Type x Number o f Reasons on perceived value and positive word o f
mouth.
Finding 6: Statistical support was found for a tw o-w ay interaction o f C redibility x
Num ber o f Reasons on purchase intention and positive word o f mouth.
Finding 7: A revised theoretical model provided support for Hypothesis 3, i.e. the
predicted

positive

relationship

consum er dissonance.

between

b elief disconfirm ation

and

Finding 8: No support was found for Hypothesis 4 which predicts the m oderating
effect o f product involvement on the

relationship

between belief

disconfirm ation and consum er dissonance.
Finding 9: Hypothesis 5 was supported since a negative relationship was found
between consum er dissonance and perceived value.
Finding 10: Positive relationships were found between perceived value and both
purchase intention and positive word-of-m outh, supporting Hypothesis 6a
and 6b, respectively.
Finding 11: Five themes o f b elief perseverance (types o f people) were identified:
Discrediters, Debaters, Skeptics, Upholders, and Fencers.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS,
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation investigates the effects o f belief disconfirm ation on consum ers’
psychological thoughts and the subsequent effect o f this mental conflict on behavioral
intentions. The prim ary objective is to address three research questions regarding
cognitive dissonance, confirm ation bias and b elief perseverance. A m ixed-m ethod
research sequence was designed specifically to exam ine these research questions. The
discussion o f findings is organized based on its relation to the research inquiries.
Theoretical contributions and managerial im plications are presented next. Lastly, the
dissertation concludes with study lim itations and suggestions for future research.
R Q 1: Can disconfirm ing evidence exposure induce considerable dissonance? I f
so, how does varying the strength o f disconfirm ing fa ctu a l evidence affect
consumer beliefs?
From the experimental results, people exposed to factual evidence dem onstrated
higher levels o f cognitive dissonance com pared to people given pro-organic, mythical
evidence. However, the strength o f evidence was not shown to be a substantial factor for
this particular relationship. That is, neither the main effects o f evidence credibility and
num ber o f reasons nor the related interaction effect appeared to have a discernible
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influence on consum er dissonance. Consequently, factual, research-based evidence could
conceivably induce sufficient dissonance to influence people’s existing beliefs even if
such evidence is not very substantial.
More people than expected had their beliefs endorsed with ‘disconfirm ing’
evidence types, whereas others (to a lesser extent) had their beliefs disapproved with
‘confirm ing’ pro-organic evidence. This outcome o f perceiving differently the two types
o f evidence may seem surprising. One can only speculate on possible explanations. In
particular, observe that the study sample consists o f college students (alumni and
current). H igher education is expected to broaden perspectives, and educated people tend
to be more knowledgeable about various subject matters, including seemingly popular,
contem porary topics such as the organic industry. This notion o f higher awareness and
knowledge offers some rationale as to w hy so many subjects in the ‘disconfirm ing’
evidence type conditions were not surprised by the facts and, also, to why some subjects
in the ‘confirm ing’ evidence type conditions expressed their doubts regarding the proorganic content. That being said, the results offer a num ber o f notable implications.
It is intriguing that the strength o f evidence (credibility and num ber o f reasons
shown) did not prove to be a significant factor in influencing people to m odify their
beliefs. More specifically, the factual evidence given to all four cells in the researchbased conditions was successful in changing beliefs regarding the perceived benefits o f
organic food. Thus, for many people, the content o f the evidence, regardless o f the
credibility or the extent o f that message, was sufficient in swaying their sentiments. This
finding is consistent with previous research, e.g., Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980), in
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the debriefing paradigm which docum ents the changing o f beliefs in the presence o f
weak, fictitious “evidence.”
RQ 2:

What are the effects o f dissonance resulting fro m b e lie f disconfirm ation on
purchase-related outcom es'?

The revised structural model provided solid support for the hypothesized model
relationships. A negative relationship was found between consum er dissonance and
perceived value, and, not surprisingly, positive relationships existed between perceive
value and both purchase intention and positive w ord o f mouth. These findings indicated
that consum ers can experience dissonance due to b elief disconfirm ations, and this
dissonance can negatively affect 1) the perceived value o f a product, 2) subsequent
intentions to buy, and 3) word o f mouth. In other words, the dissonance evoked from
disconfirm ing inform ation was a detrim ent to peoples’ perceived value o f a product and
subsequent purchase-related behavior. Thus, the premise o f this entire dissertation was
validated accordingly.
Product
disconfirm ation

involvement
and

did

consum er

not

moderate

dissonance.

the

M oreover,

relationship

between

product

involvem ent

belief
and

dissonance revealed a m arginally significant negative shared correlation. These findings
appear to conflict with some previous research which suggests that m essages o f high
involvem ent have greater personal relevance and, thus, tend to result in greater
consequences than messages o f low involvement (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1979; Petty,
Cacioppo and Schumann 1983). N ot surprisingly, the study sample com prised o f college
students displayed a relatively low level o f product involvement on average which may
explain why the case for moderation is not supported. Roughly 30% o f the sample
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consists o f non-buyers, the majority o f which stating high prices o f organic food as the
prim ary reason. However, the m arginally significant, negative relationship between
product involvement and dissonance was a bit unusual. W hy would people who are less
involved with organic food experience more dissonance (any at all) as a result o f seeing
disconfirm ing inform ation? Perhaps highly involved people may be m ore adept to using
various dissonance coping techniques. This phenom enon is argued further in the
discussion o f RQ3.
The main effects o f evidence type on each o f the three outcom es (perceived value,
purchase intention, and positive word o f mouth) were also ascertained in post hoc
analyses. Yet, much like dissonance, these outcom es remained unresponsive to the main
effects o f credibility and num ber o f reasons. However, a pair o f tw o-w ay interaction
effects o f 1) Evidence Type x N um ber o f Reasons and 2) Credibility x N um ber o f
Reasons were found on perceived value and positive w ord m outh and on purchase
intention and positive word o f mouth, respectively. Hence, the effects o f num ber o f
reasons on perceived value and positive word o f m outh depended on the type o f
evidence; while the effects o f num ber o f reasons on purchase intention and word o f
m outh depended on credibility
W hat could be implied by these interactions?

The nature o f the first tw o-w ay

interaction implies that consumers had stronger (less positive) perceived value and word
o f m outh reactions to factual information when such inform ation contained three
arguments com pared to one. Similarly, the second tw o-w ay interaction suggested that
consum ers exhibited higher intentions to buy and greater likelihood to engage in positive
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word o f m outh when exposed to high credibility evidence that contained three arguments
compared to one (perhaps due to receiving stronger confirmations).
RQ 3:

Why do consumers continue to hold onto their beliefs even though they are
exposed to robust, disconfirm ing evidence that suggests a b e lie f change is
warranted?

As mentioned previously, Festinger (1957, 1964) points out three ways that
people cope with dissonance: 1) by changing their beliefs, 2) by obtaining new
inform ation to support their existing beliefs, and 3) by reducing the im portance o f the
dissonant factors or by disregarding it altogether. M any people who experience
dissonance m itigated the cognitive conflict by m odifying their existing beliefs.
Nonetheless, a num ber o f others were more defiant, succumbing to b elief perseverance
and revealing different routes to alleviate their feelings o f dissonance. From the
qualitative assessm ent, five themes o f belief perseverance (types o f people) were
identified: Discrediters, Debaters, Skeptics, Upholders, and Fencers.
Some interesting parallels can be made between Festinger’s (1957,

1964)

dissonance coping m echanism s and the five themes o f belief perseverance that emerged
from the qualitative assessment. Debaters (who referred to contrary research) and
Upholders (who cited attributes that were not originally mentioned) are argued to use a
particular form o f the second dissonance coping technique. Specifically, these people
attempted to reinforce their existing beliefs with additional confirm ations so that their
total level o f consonance outweighs the new, unsettling dissonant thoughts. Discrediters
(who tried to belittle the significance o f disconfirm ing inform ation) and Skeptics (who
were suspicious o f any shared inform ation to begin with) are clearly taking the third route
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to resolving dissonance. That is, Discrediters were essentially reducing the im portance o f
dissonant factors by criticizing or invalidating the disconfirm ing inform ation in various
ways. On the other hand, Skeptics, due to their general sense o f suspicion and distrust for
any shared inform ation, found it easier to ignore the disconfirm ing inform ation all
together by calling it hoax. Skeptics perceived themselves as taking the high road and
saving themselves from being deceived when, in reality, they were only deceiving
them selves from learning something new that opposes their existing beliefs. W hy? The
results from this research clearly show that consonance is the status quo, and remaining
in the status quo could make life less complicated. People who m odified their beliefs as a
result o f considering the disconfirm ing evidence clearly fall into Festinger’s first method
o f dissonance coping. Fencers (who showed signs o f b elief m odification but are a bit
hesitant) were likely to take the first route to dissonance resolution and change their
beliefs with additional persuasion.

Theoretical Contributions
The study

exam ines possible

links between

the pervasive psychological

phenom ena o f confirm ation bias and b elief perseverance to Festinger’s (1957) theory o f
cognitive dissonance. Consum er research on cognitive dissonance has limited the scope
o f this extensive theory by narrowly focusing on occurrences o f dissonance after a
consum er has made a decision or a purchase. Although previous research on post
purchase dissonance (or buyer’s remorse) provides important theoretical and practical
im plications, this dissertation dem onstrates that dissonance may arise in num erous other
ways outside decision making.
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A m ong the main goals o f this study is to show that dissonance could arise prior to
a purchase because o f belief disconfirm ing evidence regarding perceived product
benefits. The results reveal that dissonance can be evoked by presenting people with
disconfirm ing evidence about the perceived benefits o f buying and consum ing organic
foods. An em pirical test o f dissonance provocation stem m ing from perceived belief
disconfirm ations connotes the negative effects o f dissonance on marketing-related
outcomes. Therefore, this research offers an alternative approach to testing cognitive
dissonance theory.
An exam ination o f the extant literature exposes a lack o f existing scales for
measuring a person’s proclivity to b elief perseverance. In addition to displaying a strong
connection between dissonance theory and belief perseverance, the qualitative assessm ent
o f why consum er beliefs persevere (along with the five em erging themes) provides a
solid foundation for a scale developm ent on belief perseverance. Future research
em ploying such a scale could serve as a valuable tool for consum er researchers to
identify and exam ine obstinate consumers.

M anagerial Im plications
Academ ic research on cognitive dissonance would only benefit marketing
practitioners if it provides guidance as to w hat can and should be done about a custom er’s
dissonance (Hunt

1970). M arketing m anagers are cognizant that being able to

successfully reduce dissonance levels o f their patrons provides a vital com petitive
advantage. In this study, the com mon link shown between cognitive dissonance and
belief perseverance has shed light on the question o f why custom ers’ erroneous beliefs
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can persist despite exposure to substantial disconfirm ing evidence, and this offers
important im plications for m arketing strategy.
Generally speaking, it can be argued that consumers tend to adopt inaccurate
information when such information promotes a potentially ingratiating self-concept.
Given that organic food consum ption is usually considered prosocial, and therefore
potentially ingratiating, consumers m ay aspire to be perceived as folks who consume
organic food. As such, consumers with a positive orientation tow ard organic food
promotion, in particular, may make themselves vulnerable to accepting superficial (or
even inaccurate) inform ation if such inform ation promotes their self-image. Although this
effect is not found to be exacerbated in instances o f high product involvement, this study
still has important implications for policy makers and marketers in their quest to educate
consumers and influence their behaviors. M oreover, the qualitative assessm ent o f belief
perseverance is a step forward for more constructive com m unication between policy
makers, marketers, and custom ers about how to mitigate the enactm ent o f incorrect
beliefs.
Consider-the-opposite strategy (Ross, Lepper and Hubbard 1975; Anderson 1982;
Lord, Lepper and Preston 1984) may be the only available technique capable to
successfully rem edy the confirmation bias and instances o f belief perseverance. The
technique sim ply involves encouraging consumers to reflect on reasons that their
subjective beliefs m ight be incorrect and w hy the opposing view m ay instead be true.
This study explored open-ended statements to reveal w hy beliefs persist in the face o f
disconfirm ing evidence. The subsequent five em erging themes (or types o f consumers)
infer additional corrective strategies for overcom ing belief perseverance. In other words,
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the five em erging themes o f belief perseverance can potentially offer some guidance to
m anagers on how to persuade consumers to interrogate their beliefs and rebuff their
incorrect preconceived notion about certain products or product attributes. Moreover,
m anagers m ay also gain insight for effectively dissem inating product inform ation and
strengthening arguments against m isguided consumption. For example, a corrective
strategy for Debaters, who are sure to em phasize the presence o f contrary research, may
be to present both arguments (disconfirm ing and confirm ing) together so that the
evidence does not seem biased. A better strategy for Discrediters, on the other hand,
could perhaps entail using m ore com prehensive, robust evidence to bolster the
disconfirm ing inform ation from attacks on its integrity. Thus, the preceding research on
consum ers’ beliefs about organic foods and subsequent reactions to disconfirm ations
could provide im portant inferences to help in the formulation o f com m unication,
environm ental, and policy strategies to educate (and update) consumers w henever new,
accurate inform ation emerges.

Lim itations and Future Research
The research presented in this dissertation has several limitations. First, the study
relies on data obtained from a sample o f undergraduate and graduate college students and
university alumni. While such a group may not represent a standard sample o f
consumers, college students (current and former) are consum ers that may have strong
subjective beliefs about certain products. M oreover, using student samples is not
uncom mon for em pirically testing a theory. Supporters o f using student subjects (e.g.,
Gordon, Slade and Schmitt 1986; Greenberg 1987; Lee and Baskerville 2003) argue that
research should focus less on generalizability and thus student samples can be appropriate
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for building a theory and em phasizing its internal mechanism. Consequently, there is a
reasonable justification for using student subjects when testing theory such as the
dissonance theory.
Nevertheless, future research on this topic would greatly benefit from different
samples o f more typical consumers who have high involvement with organic food. For
exam ple, Lea and W orsley (2005) find that women are more positive about organic food
than men. Specifically, their findings suggest that women are more likely to believe that
organic food has more vitamins and minerals than conventional food. The results in this
dissertation corroborate this notion since female subjects reported slightly higher means
com pared to male subjects for each o f the three perceived benefits o f organic food.
Second, although experimentation is employed in the study, the resulting data
from the survey responses are essentially cross-sectional in nature. An experimental
design involving longitudinal data is more suitable to investigate the theorized causal
relationships via structural equation modeling. Avenues for future research could include
the exam ination o f long term effects o f b elief disconfirm ation on subsequent consum er
behavior. This dissertation suggests that b elief disconfirm ations can induce dissonance
which in turn can negatively im pact marketing-related outcomes. M anagers m ay derive
greater practical implications from a long-term assessm ent o f these effects.
Third, the perceived value construct is measured using only one o f Sweeney and
Soutar’s (2001) four proposed dim ensions, i.e. quality value. Emotional, price, and social
value are all left out o f the m easurement theory based on the view that such dim ensions
do not fit with the context o f the study. Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) suggest that
focusing single mindedly on the consum er as information processor could limit our
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perception o f consum er behavior due to neglecting the experiential aspect. Therefore, a
fruitful avenue o f future research may involve a hedonic assessm ent o f value. For
example, Babin, Darden and Griffin (1994) propose a two-dim ensional measure
com prising utilitarian and hedonic shopping value. This conceptualization could provide
a better m easure o f value since emotional aspects tend to spill over into information
processing and decision-making (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Thus, people buy
products not only for what they can do but also for w hat they mean.
Fourth, the manipulation o f evidence types into confirm ing and disconfirm ing
conditions did not work as efficiently as anticipated. O ver 20% o f subjects in
disconfirm ing conditions are found to have preconceived negative views o f organic food
and/or the organic industry. Hence, many subjects viewed the disconfirm ing evidence
regarding organic food as “confirm ing” their existing beliefs. Future research could
em ploy a quasi-experim ental design to mitigate this quandary. For instance, instead o f
random ly assigning subjects to one o f the eight conditions, subjects can be assigned to
disconfirm ing (or confirm ing) conditions based on how they respond to a certain criterion
(e.g. subjective beliefs, attitudes, etc.). This may provide the researcher with superior
control, albeit at the expense o f internal validity since quasi-experim ental results are
especially prone to confounding variables.
Finally, the revised theoretical model contains an added structural path from
purchase intention to positive word-of-m outh, whereas prior research generally supports
a reverse causal path from word-of-m outh to purchase intention. The justification for this
removed constraint is based on the notion that consum ers are unlikely to engage in
positive word-of-m outh until and unless they are w illing to purchase a product
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themselves. Hence, this study defines word-of-m outh as the consum er's expressed
likelihood o f making positive com ments about organic food, while other research
examines word-of-m outh from the information received (or sought) by the consum er
point o f view. Future research could exam ine additional outcomes following belief
disconfirm ations such as information seeking behavior (confirm ing or disconfirming).
Those who seek confirm ing information to corroborate their own views following a belief
disconfirm ation may be especially prone to yielding to confirm ation bias.
One area o f interest that may particularly exacerbate the confirm ation bias is
consum er superstitions. Consumers having superstitious beliefs and m aking uncanny
associations is not uncom mon in the marketplace, and this phenom enon may lead to
irrational behavior. For example, Block and Kramer (2009) exam ined superstitious
beliefs in the context o f product perform ance expectations and found that consumers who
do not hold superstitious beliefs adhere to the rational choice paradigm more so than
consum ers who do have certain superstitions. That is, consum ers’ superstitious beliefs
can lead to m aking purchases that run counter to economic rationality. Interestingly
enough, results from M owen and Carlson (2003) suggest a negative association between
superstitious beliefs and attitudes regarding genetically m odified foods. Examining
w hether the same relationship exists between consum er superstitions and organic food
beliefs could provide additional explanation to instances o f belief perseverance in this
study.

APPENDIX A
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1)

D isconfirm ing x High Credibility x 3:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies and
concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were no more nutritious and
no less likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than
conventionally grown foods, which tend to be far less expensive. The researchers
also found no obvious health advantages to organic meats. The Stanford
University researchers affirmed that there is currently no direct evidence that
consum ing an organic diet leads to improved health or lower risk o f disease.
Furthermore, organic farm ing m ethods are not as environm entally friendly as
once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much less
food than conventional farming on the same land area.

2)

D isconfirm ing x High Credibility x 1 *:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies and
concluded that organic farming m ethods are not as environm entally friendly as
once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much less
food than conventional farm ing on the same land area.

3)

D isconfirm ing x Low Credibility x 3:
Delta Com m unity College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies
and concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were no m ore nutritious
and no less likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than
conventionally grown foods, which tend to be far less expensive. The researchers
also found no obvious health advantages to organic meats. The Delta Com m unity
College researchers affirm ed that there is currently no direct evidence that
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consum ing an organic diet leads to im proved health or lower risk o f disease.
Furthermore, organic farming methods are not as environm entally friendly as
once thought since these m ethods have lower yields and, thus, produce much less
food than conventional farming on the same land area.
4)

D isconfirm ingx Low Credibility x I*:
Delta Com m unity College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies
and concluded that organic farming methods are not as environm entally friendly
as once thought since these methods have lower yields and, thus, produce much
less food than conventional farming on the same land area.

5)

C onfirm ing x High Credibility x 3:
Stanford U niversity researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies and
concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were more nutritious and less
likely to be contam inated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than conventionally
grown foods. The researchers also found various health advantages to organic
meats. The Stanford University researchers affirmed that there is direct evidence
that consuming an organic diet can lead to im proved health and lower risk o f
disease. Furthermore, organic farm ing is significantly less disturbing for the
environm ent com pared to conventional farming.

6)

C onfirm ing x High Credibility x 1 *:
Stanford University researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies and
concluded that organic farming is significantly less disturbing for the environm ent
com pared to conventional farming.
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7)

Confirm ing x Low Credibility x 3:
Delta Com m unity College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies
and concluded that fruits and vegetables labeled organic were more nutritious and
less likely to be contaminated by dangerous bacteria like E. coli than
conventionally

grown

foods.

The

researchers

also

found

various

health

advantages to organic meats. The Delta Com m unity College researchers affirmed
that there is direct evidence that consuming an organic diet can lead to improved
health and lower risk o f disease. Furthermore, organic farm ing is significantly less
disturbing for the environm ent compared to conventional farming.
8)

Confirm ing x Low Credibility x 1 *:
Delta Com m unity College researchers evaluated data from hundreds o f studies
and concluded that organic farming is significantly less disturbing for the
environm ent compared to conventional farming.

*W eak-condition evidence is com posed assum ing that environm ental friendliness is the
least im portant o f the three reasons for buying organic. This assumption is evaluated and
corroborated via two different samples (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2).
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M easuring Subjective Beliefs
Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Slightly
Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Slightly
Agree
5

Agree
6

Strongly
Agree
7

I. Perceived Health Benefits: a consumer's subjective beliefs regarding the perceived
healthiness o f organic food.
I. The consum ption o f organic food enhances m y health.
2 . 1 believe that organic food enables me to live healthy.
3 . 1 am o f the view that the consum ption o f organic food has a health-prom oting effect.
4. Organic food and a health-conscious lifestyle match well.
II. Perceived Environmental Benefits: a consumer's subjective beliefs regarding the
positive effects that organic products can have on the environment.
1. The production o f organic food goes easy on resources.
2 . 1 am o f the opinion that during the production o f organic food the environm ent
is highly valued.
3. Organic foods are environm entally friendly products.
4. Organic food and environm entalism match well.
III. Perceived Safety Benefits: a consumer's subjective beliefs regarding the positive
effects that organic food can have on safe consumption.
1 . 1 feel that organic food is free o f chem ical residues.
2 . 1 am o f the opinion that organic food is not contaminated.
3. Organic food ingredients are free o f pesticides.
4 . 1 believe that organic food features high food safety.
Note: All three dim ensions o f perceived benefits o f organic food adapted from Bauer,
Heinrich and Schafer (2013).
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M easuring B elief Disconfirm ation
Congruency (Beliefs/Information): measures the similarity (or lack thereof) between a
consum er’s prior beliefs about organic food and the new evidence that he or she has been
exposed to (Giirhan-Canli and M aheswaran 1998).
1. How different was the information from what you expected? not at all / very different
2. Indicate the extent to which the information was: totally exp ected / unexpected
3. Indicate the extent to which the inform ation was: not at all surprising / very surprising
M easuring C onsum er Dissonance
Not at
All
1

-

-

Neutral

-

-

2

3

4

5

6

Very
Much
7

Discomfort: measures the extent to which a person is experiencing a state o f
psychological tension and is troubled by it, i.e. a measure o f cognitive dissonance
and Devine 1994).
1. uncom fortable
2. uneasy
3. bothered
M easuring the M oderator
Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Slightly
Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Slightly
Agree
5

Agree
6

Strongly
Agree
7

Involvement: measures a consum er’s level o f interest in organic food (adapted from
Beatty and Talpade 1994).
1. In general I have a strong interest in organic food.
2. Organic food is very im portant to me.
3. Organic food m atters a lot to me.
4 . 1 get bored when other people talk to me about organic food, (r)
5. Organic food is very relevant to me.

Assessing the M anipulation
Evidence Believability: measures the degree o f agreement with the following evaluative
items regarding the content o f the evidence (Chang 2011).
1. believable
2. trustw orthy
3. credible
4 . reasonable
5. convincing
6. unbiased

M easuring the Outcom e Variables
Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Slightly
Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Slightly
Agree
5

Agree
6

Strongly
Agree
7

I. Consum er Perceived Value (Sweeney and Soutar 2001; W alsh, Shiu and Hassan 2014)
Factor 1: Quality Value
1. Has consistent quality
2. Is well made
3. Has an acceptable standard o f quality
Factor 2: Emotional Value
4 . 1 enjoy it
5. Makes me want to consume it
6. M akes me feel good
Factor 3: Price Value
7. Is reasonably priced
8. Offers value for money
9. Is good for the price
Factor 4: Social Value
10. Help me feel accepted
11. Improves the w ay I am perceived
12. M akes a good impression on other people
II. Purchase Intention: measures the inclination o f a consum er to buy (or at least try)
organic food in the future (adapted from Putrevu and Lord 1994).
1. It is very likely that I will buy organic food.
2 . 1 will purchase organic food the next time I need groceries.
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3 . 1 will definitely try to buy organic food.
4. Suppose that a friend called you to get your advice in his/her grocery shopping trip.
W ould you recom mend him /her to buy organic?
III. Positive W ord o f Mouth: a consumer's expressed likelihood o f m aking positive
com m ents about organic food is m easured in this scale (adapted from Briiggen, Foubert,
and Grem ler 2011).
1 . 1 am
2 . 1 am
3 . 1 am
4 . 1 am

likely
likely
likely
likely

to
to
to
to

say positive things about organic food to other people.
recom m end organic food to a friend or colleague.
say positive things about organic food in general to other people.
encourage friends and relatives to buy organic food.

IV. W illingness to Pay a Price Premium: the am ount a custom er is willing to pay for
organic food over conventional food o f the same package size or quantity (adapted from
N etem eyer et al. 2004).
1. The price o f organic food would have to go up quite a bit before I w ould switch to nonorganic.
2 . 1 am willing to pay a higher price for organic food than for non-organic food.
3 . 1 am w illing to p a y
% more for organic food over non-organic food:
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

1

2

3

4

5

6

30% or
more
7

4. I am w illing to pay a lot more for organic food than non-organic food.
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Subjective Beliefs (M easurem ent #2)
Com pared to your beliefs before you were exposed to the factual inform ation, use the
sliding scales below to indicate how your beliefs about organic food have changed:
1 .1 now believe that organic food is:
Less H ealthy / Unchanged / More Healthy
2 . 1 now believe that organic food is:
Less Safe to Consume / Unchanged / M ore Safe to Consume
3. I now believe that organic food production is:
Less Environment-Friendly / Unchanged / More Environment-Friendly

Social Desirability Bias
Not
True
1

-

-

Neutral

-

-

2

3

4

5

6

Very
True
7

Short Balanced Inventory o f Desirable Responding Scale (Short BIDR-6)
(Bobbio and M anganelli 2011; Paulhus 1984)
I. M y first impressions o f people usually turn out to be right.
2 . 1 always know why I like things.
3. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
4 . 1 am fully in control o f my own fate.
5 . 1 never regret m y decisions.
6 . 1 am a com pletely rational person.
7 . 1 am very confident in my judgm ents.
8. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
9 . 1 sometimes tell lies, if I have to.
10. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage o f someone.
I I . 1 always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.
1 2 .1 have said som ething bad about a friend behind his or her back.
13.1 have never dropped litter on the street.
1 4 .1 have done things that I d o n ’t tell other people about.
15.1 have taken sick-leave from w ork or school even though I w asn’t really sick.
1 6 .1 have some pretty awful habits.
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Qualitative Exam ination
A ll subjects:
1)

W hat was your reaction to the researchers’ report on organic food? Please
describe your reaction in as much detail as you can.

B eliefperseverance:
2)

W hy were you not convinced by the evidence presented to you? W hat additional
evidence or inform ation would help you change your stance? Please explain in as
much detail as you can.

B elief change:
2)

W hy were you convinced by the evidence presented to you? W hat was the most
significant factor in changing your perspective? Please explain in as much detail
as you can.

All subjects'.
3)

W hat do you think is the purpose o f this study?
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